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THE EFFECT OF AUDITORS’ ASSESSMENT OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER 
FINANCIAL REPORTING ON AUDIT FEES, COST OF DEBT AND NET COMPLIANCE 
BENEFIT 
 
In this study, I use Section 404(b) of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act as an exogenous shock to 
examine the effect of auditors’ assessment of internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) on 
audit fees, cost of debt, and net value of compliance between 2002 and 2010. Using firms 
themselves as their own control, this study conducts firm-fixed effects analyses to explore the 
close causal effect of SOX 404(b) on compliance costs (proxied by audit fees), compliance 
benefit (proxied by cost of debt) and net compliance benefit (proxied by Tobin’s q). Through 
analyzing how SOX 404(b) affects firms’ compliance cost, compliance benefit, and net 
compliance benefit, the results suggest that SOX 404(b) decreases firms’ cost of debt, but also 
imposes compliance costs. Overall, SOX 404(b) increases firm value premium by around 8.63%. 
The study also examines whether the 2007 reforms have achieved their purpose by comparing 
audit fees before and after the 2007 reforms.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) 
took effect July 21, 2010, permanently exempting non-accelerated filers from Section 404(b) of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.1 Non-accelerated filers are issuers whose public float is under 
$75million. SOX 404(b) requires external auditors to assess internal control over the financial 
report (ICFR). Stakeholders need to find out: what are the effects of this exemption? From the 
implementation of the original provision to the exemption less than a decade later, SOX 404(b) 
has engendered controversy and debate. Ball (2009) observes that we are still not clear today 
about the value of the 1933-1934 Securities Acts, and we are certainly far from understanding the 
effects of Section 404(b). Thus, before we can evaluate the SOX 404(b) exemption, we need to 
answer a more fundamental question: what is the value of SOX 404(b)? 
In this study, I use Section 404(b) of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act as an exogenous 
shock to examine the effect of auditors’ assessment of internal control over financial reporting on 
audit fees, cost of debt, and net compliance benefit between 2002 and 2010.  Following prior 
literature (Minton and Schrand 1999; Ahmed et al. 2002; Jiang 2008; Cassell et al. 2011), I use 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) long-term domestic issuer credit rating to estimate the cost of debt. 
Following Daske et al. (2008), I use Tobin’s q to proxy net compliance benefit. The appendix in 
Daske et al. (2008)’s study provides a detailed discussion regarding the theoretical concept and 
measurement of Tobin’s q.   
Under Section 404 of management assessment of internal control of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
part (a) requires management to certify or disclose their assessment of internal control over 
financial reporting (ICFR) to investors. Part (b) requires auditors to attest and report on 
management’s assessment. The Dodd-Frank Act went into effect in 2010, adding Section 404(c), 
                                                            
1 In the following of this paper, I use SOX for Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. I use SOX 404(b) for section 
404 (b) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
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which permanently exempts all non-accelerated filers from SOX 404(b).  
The regulation change created different groups of firms which comply with SOX 404(a) 
and (b) on different schedules. “Large accelerated filers” include companies with a public float of 
$700 million or more. Reporting companies with a public float between $75 and $700 are defined 
as “accelerated filers”.  For U.S. issuers, large accelerated filers and accelerated filers are required 
to comply with SOX 404(a) and SOX 404(b) starting with the fiscal year ending on or after 
November 15, 2004. Non-accelerated filers—any firm below $75 million in public float—must 
comply with SOX 404(a) for fiscal year ending on or after December 15, 2007, and they are 
exempted from SOX 404(b) as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Public float is the “aggregate market value of voting and non-voting common equity held 
by non-affiliates of the issuer” (SEC release 33-8644), and it is measured on the “last business 
day of the issuers’ most recently completed second fiscal quarter” (SEC release 33-8644). Non-
accelerated filers whose public float breaks the $75 million threshold automatically change their 
status and are required to comply with SOX 404(b) during that fiscal year. Accelerated filers can 
become non-accelerated when their public float falls below $50 million during that fiscal year 
(SEC release 33-8644). 
After the passage of SOX 404(b) several years ago, the recent change brought by the 
SOX 404(c) exemption for non-accelerated filers makes for a unique study in financial regulation. 
Every entity involved in this regulation—including the regulators, investors, auditors and 
managers—has strong interest in evaluating the benefit and cost of Section 404(b). Regulators 
particularly are interested in finding out not only how SOX 404(b) affects accelerated filers, but 
also how SOX 404(b) would affect non-accelerated filers in the absence of an exemption. Not 
surprisingly, the most consistent conclusion we have gotten is that SOX 404(b) is costly, and the 
cost is disproportionally high for the small firms (CRA 2006; GAO 2006; Zhang 2007;  
Raghunandan and Rama 2006; Hogan and Wilkins 2008; Hoitash et al. 2008; SEC survey (SEC 
[2009a]); Iliev. 2010; Kinney and Shepardson 2011). 
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Concerned with high audit costs, regulators passed two reforms in 2007 aimed at 
reducing the compliance burden of SOX 404 by addressing ICFR assessments (SEC 2011). First, 
the SEC released guidance on management reporting on internal control over financial reporting 
on June 2007. Second, the PCAOB adopted Auditing Standard No.5 (AS5) on December 2007. 
Both the SEC guidance and AS5 proposed an approach of “top-down, risk-based evaluation of 
internal control over financial reporting” (SEC release No.33-8810; 34-55929). The SEC 
guidance addresses management’s self-assessment, while AS5 focuses on the auditor’s 
assessment. The 2007 reforms aim to decrease the compliance cost of SOX 404 by directing 
management and auditors to focus on high-risk accounts. The justification behind SOX 404(c) 
permanently exempting all non-accelerated filers from SOX 404(b) is the same as for the 2007 
reform. However, controversy surrounds the idea of exempting small firms from so many 
regulations (Bradford 2004; Campbell 2006; Castelluccio 2005; Orcutt 2009; Anginer, Nararayan, 
Schipani and Seyhun forthcoming).   
Using firms themselves as their own control, this study conducts firm-fixed effects 
analyses to explore the close causal effect of SOX 404(b) on compliance costs (proxied by audit 
fees), compliance benefit (proxied by cost of debt) and the net compliance benefit (proxied by 
Tobin’s q). Through analyzing how SOX 404(b) affects firms’ compliance cost, compliance 
benefit, and net compliance benefit, the results suggest that SOX 404(b) decreases firms’ cost of 
debt, but also imposes compliance costs. Overall, SOX 404(b) brings firm net compliance benefit. 
The study also examines whether the 2007 reforms have achieved their purpose by comparing 
audit fees before and after the 2007 reforms.                                                       
This study is motivated by two concerns. First, many studies have conducted insightful 
research on the effects of internal control quality on the cost of debt; but there has not been direct 
evidence on the value of obtaining the auditor’s assessment, independent of internal control 
quality. For example, prior studies have examined the relationship between ICFR quality and 
earnings quality (Bedard 2006; Doyle et al. 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008) and the results 
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suggest that strong internal control systems provide higher earnings quality. Some studies provide 
evidence that an ineffective internal control system—meaning the existence of one or more 
material weakness—associates with a high cost of equity (Beneish et al. 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife 
et al. 2009) and a high cost of private and public debt (Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Costello et al. 2011; 
Kim et al. 2011). One study links effective ICFR with accurate management forecast (Feng et al. 
2009). Another study (Goh et al. 2011) provides evidence for an association between effective 
ICFR and conditional conservatism. A few studies associate both high quality of corporate 
government, as well as independent audit committees, with strong internal control systems 
(Krishnan2005; Zhang et al. 2007; Hoitash et al.2009; Goh 2009). 
  The sample under internal control quality research is limited to firms under auditor 
scrutiny, and they focus on the outcome of the auditor assessment of internal control.  Non-
accelerated filers make up 60% of all issuers, yet studies have only focused on accelerated filers. 
Indeed, all these studies provide useful evidence on how effective internal control systems will 
affect firms via different mechanisms. However, another fundamental question, which is not fully 
answered, is that, for all firms, what are the cost, benefit and net compliance benefit of SOX 
404(b)? Particularly, how do investors value the auditors’ attestation of ICFR? Regulators are 
particularly interested in this question because SOX 404 addresses only disclosures and 
attestations (and incurs costs while doing so), without issuing additional requirements for internal 
controls. 
Some studies have examined the value of auditors’ assessments in the role of uncovering 
ICFR deficiencies. Using a sample of propriety data, Bedard and Graham (2011) present evidence 
that auditors’ attestations contain better information than management’s disclosures. Specifically, 
their results indicate auditors detect more unremediated internal control deficiencies (ICDs) than 
management. They also find that auditors use a lower threshold to classify ICDs as a significant 
deficiency or material weakness. However, using a sample of firms whose market capitalization 
is under $300 million, Kinney and Shepardson (2011) find there is no statistical difference in the 
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increase in the disclosure rate of material weakness for accelerated filers which are subject to 
auditors’ assessment, and non-accelerated filers which are not subject to auditors’ involvement at 
their initial year of compliance respectively (2004 for accelerated filers and 2007 for non-
accelerated filers).  
Section 404(b) remains controversial, and research has not reached a firm conclusion. 
Regulators have shown notable interest in evaluating the regulation of SOX 404(b). Recently, 
according to Section 989I of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
must study  “the cost of capital for issuers that are exempt from such section 404(b) compared to 
the cost of capital for issuers that are required to comply with such section 404(b) and whether 
there is any difference in the confidence of investors in the integrity of financial statements of 
issuers that comply with such section 404(b) and issuers that are exempt from compliance with 
such section 404(b)” (SEC 2011). Recently, a surge in restatements by non-accelerated filers just 
after their exemption from Section 404(b) has drawn all the related parties’ attention and 
highlighted the debate over whether non-accelerated filers should be exempt (see Whitehouse, 
2011).  
This study seeks to investigate the value of SOX 404(b) over a relatively long time. This 
study examines a longer post-SOX 404(b) period than merely the initial implementation year. 
Section 404(b) aims to “[offer] significant long-term benefit in helping to prevent fraud and 
misdirection of corporate resources and in improving the accuracy of financial reporting “(SEC, 
2005a). The SOX 2002 Act occurred in response to a series of high-profile corporate scandals. 
The Act frequently receives criticism because, given the circumstances and environment at the 
time, SOX may represent overregulation and encourage auditors to overreact. Section 404 is the 
most significant reform in financial reporting and corporation governance in eight decades 
(Donaldson, 2005; Li, Pincus, & Rego, 2008). However, Section 404(b) is probably the most 
controversial regulation as well. The main debate is whether the benefit of compliance outweighs 
its cost, especially for the small firms. 
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Proper analysis of compliance costs requires data taken over a long time period. 
According to an SEC-sponsored Web survey on investigating the implementation of Section 404 
in 2009, “Some of [the compliance] costs are recurring fixed costs while others are one-time start-
up costs borne in the first years of compliance that tend to dissipate over time”. Setting up an 
internal control system requires an investment by a firm, and we cannot reach the conclusion that 
the cost is too high based only on the initial investment cost. Meanwhile, SOX 404(b) comes 
from a truly unusual regulation regime, and both regulators and auditors may have overreacted 
given the circumstances. All previous studies have analyzed the cost for firms beginning to 
comply with both SOX 404(a) and 404(b), but none has isolated 404(b) costs. Now that, non-
accelerated filers have paid costs to comply with 404(a), it is possible to identify 404(b)-specific 
costs as companies move from non-accelerated to accelerated status.  
Two studies (Altamuro and Beatty 2010; Krishnan and Yu 2012) have investigated the 
effect of auditors’ assessment of ICFR while another two studies (Iliev2010; Singer and You 
2011) examined the joint effect of both 404(a) and 404(b). This present study is quite different 
from any of the above four studies. 
Krishnan and Yu (2012) examine the effect of SOX 404(b) on revenue quality. Using a 
sample of large non-accelerated firms and small accelerated firms, they find a positive association 
between revenue quality and auditor assessment of ICFR. In Altamuro and Beatty (2010)’s paper, 
they investigate the effect of the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
(FDICIA) of 1991 on the loan-loss provision validity, earnings persistence, cash-flow 
predictability, benchmark-beating, and accounting conservatism in the U.S. banking industry. 
Their results show that FDICIA has affected financial reporting in a positive way. FDICIA is 
similar to SOX 404(b), but only applies to the banking industry. The major difference between 
this study and Altamuro & Beatty’s study lies within the broader scope—this study provides more 
generalizable results for all shareholders.  
In Singer and You (2011)’s study, they compare American accelerated filers against 
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Canadian firms which list on a U.S. exchange in order to investigate the effect of Section 404 on 
earning qualities in the pre-404 period (2002-2003) and post-404 period (2004-2005). They use 
absolute abnormal accruals to proxy earnings reliability, and find “complying firms reduced the 
absolute magnitude of their abnormal accruals significantly more than the control firms” (Singer 
and You, p570). They also present weak evidence that complying firms experience a greater 
decrease in intentional misstatement than control firms after Section 404 took effect. They find 
that after Section 404, the earnings predictive ability increased more for the complying firms than 
for the noncompliance firms.  
Using cross-sectional data in 2004, Iliev (2010) investigated the effect of SOX 404 on 
audit fees, financial reporting quality and firm market value at the initial year of implementation. 
He finds that SOX 404 improves earnings quality, evidenced by decreased abnormal accrual and 
increase audit fees. He also finds that SOX 404 decreases firm market value, measured using 
stock returns and event studies. 
This study’s substantial contribution lies in it being the first to capture a complete picture 
of how SOX 404 affects firms’ audit cost, cost of debt, and net compliance benefit. At the initial 
three years of implementation of SOX 404, this study provides evidence that the implementation 
cost is unusually high, and the value of SOX 404 during this time period is unclear.  After the 
2007 reform, implementation costs have decreased; the cost of debt has decreased, and the net 
compliance benefit has increased. This finding is of particular interest to regulators, providing 
empirical evidence on how this regulation is affecting firms. 
The second contribution is that this study examines the pure effect of SOX 404(b) by 
isolating this subsection from other regulations, and particularly from SOX 404(a). Using a 
sample of firms that have newly began or discontinued complying with SOX 404(b), the study 
examines firm-specific consequences of auditors’ assessment of ICFR. The study provides clear 
evidence on the value of auditors’ assessment of ICFR by identifying the changes at the firm level 
of audit fees, cost of debt and net compliance benefit due to the exogenous legal requirement. 
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This study examines the differences in both cost of capital and investors’ confidence for 
accelerated and non-accelerated filers. 
This study also adds to the broad literature regarding the value of auditor assurance 
services, providing evidence for the value of auditors’ assessment of ICFR. From theory, Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983) demonstrate that agency problems arise when 
there is a separation of ownership and control. Management tends to maximize its own interests, 
which often do not align with shareholders’ interests. Information asymmetry further exacerbates 
the agency problem because management always possesses better access to information than 
shareholders. One way to decrease information asymmetry is to strengthen monitoring 
mechanisms through a third party: auditors. Prior studies have documented the value of auditor 
assurance services in mitigating the effects of information asymmetry (Blackwell et al.1998). 
Using the legal shock as the basis, this study provides new evidence on the cost, benefit, and net 
compliance benefit of auditors’ attestation ICFR. 
Some limitations of this research: first, this study does not cover an exhaustive set of 
benefits from SOX 404(b) since other benefits exist beside a decreased cost of debt, such as an 
improvement in outsiders’ confidence in the company. Second, this study is only concerned with 
the real effects of 404(b); not whether the regulation was the best way to achieve the goals of its 
drafters.  
This study is organized as follows: Chapter 2 explains the history surrounding SOX 404; 
Extant literature, hypothesis development and research questions appear in Chapter3; Chapter 4 
describes the data and empirical models; Chapter 5 outlines the sample selection procedure; 
Chapter 6 presents the data and primary results; Chapter 7 present an example and further 
analysis; Chapter 8 summarizes the results and concludes this study. 
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Chapter 2 
Institution background 
Since 1977, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) has required all issuers--no matter 
how small they are--to maintain an internal control system.  What SOX 404 required beyond 
FCPA is an increase in disclosure requirements for issuers (Palmrose 2010). Section 404(a) 
focused on management’s disclosure regarding the outcome of the assessment of internal control 
over financing reporting. Strictly speaking, SOX 404(a) is not totally novel because firms are 
required to disclose the ICFR as part of their 8-K filings when there is a change in auditors. 
Section 404(b) requires auditors to assess and report on managements’ assessment of ICFR. Thus, 
Section 404(b) is an entirely new regulation.  
The U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on July 25, 2002 in response to a 
series of high-profile financial scandals. The legislation was intended to restore investors’ 
confidence in capital markets. Two separate sections under SOX—Section 302 and Section 
404—are related to internal control over financial reporting.  When it comes to financial reporting, 
these two Sections constitute the bulk of SOX’s effect because they directly address the process 
of generating financial reporting. Under the title of “Corporate Responsibility for Financial 
Reports”, Section 302 requires management to certify the internal control over financial reporting 
in its quarterly and annual filings.  The title of Section 404 is “Management Assessment of 
Internal Control”. Section 404 originally included parts (a) and (b) when signed into law. Section 
404(a) requires all the issuers submit annual internal control reports and shall 
(1) State the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an adequate 
internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting; and 
(2) Contain an assessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscal year of the issuer, of the 
effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial 
reporting (SOX 404). 
 
Meanwhile, in Section (b) under the title of “Internal Control Evaluation and Reporting”, 
it states auditors “shall attest to, and report on, the assessment (of internal control over financial 
reporting) made by the management of the issuer”.   
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The implementation of Section 404(b) for non-accelerated filers has been postponed 
several times and permanently halted with the exemption in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act.  The 
initial date for both accelerated filers and non-accelerated filers to comply with Section 404(a) 
and Section 404(b) was June 15, 2004 (SEC release 33-8238). Then, on Feb.24, 2004, the SEC 
extended the compliance date for accelerated filers to November 15, 2004. Meanwhile, the SEC 
extended the same requirement for non-accelerated filers to July 15, 2005 (SEC release 33-8392). 
While accelerated filers were held to the November 2004 deadline, the SEC gave another 
extension on March 2, 2005 for non-accelerated filers to comply with both sections on July 15, 
2006 (SEC release 33-8545). The SEC repeatedly postponed the deadline. Since then, the SEC 
separated the requirement of compliance with Section (a) and Section (b) and gave several extra 
extensions for non-accelerated filers to comply with the two Sections. On Sep.22, 2005, the SEC 
extended the compliance dates for the non-accelerated filers to comply Section 404 (a) to July 15, 
2006 (SEC release 33-8168). Another extension was grounded on Dec15, 2006. Once again, the 
SEC extended the compliance date for the non-accelerated filers to comply with Section 404 (a) 
from July 15, 2006 to December 15, 2007 (SEC release 33-8760). Meanwhile, the SEC 
mentioned that the date should be postponed again. For the first time, the SEC states the date for 
the non-accelerated filers to comply with Section 404 (b) is December 15, 2008. On Jun. 26, 2008, 
the SEC release the amendments to its prior release and made the date of December 15, 2009 to 
be the compliance date of Section 404 (b) for the non-accelerated filers (SEC Release 33-8934). 
On Oct 13, 2009, the SEC further postponed the compliance date of Section 404 (b) for non-
accelerated filers to June 15, 2010 (SEC release 33-9072). Finally, on Sep 15, 2010, the SEC 
adopted Section 404(c) as a result of Section 989G of the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 404(c) 
exempts non-accelerated filers from Section 404(b), meaning that non-accelerated filers shall not 
provide an auditor assessment of internal control over financial reporting in their annual report. In 
a summary, the compliance date of Section 404(a) and Section 404(b) for the accelerated filers is 
November 15, 2004. The compliance date of Section 404(a) for the non-accelerated filers is 
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December 15, 2007. 
Figure 1 outlines the timeline of regulatory events. I divided the whole period into two 
major parts—before 2007 reform and after 2007 reform. Before 2007 reform period includes two 
events. Fiscal year ending on or after November 15 2004, SOX 404(a) and SOX 404(b) 
implemented for accelerated filers. Fiscal year ending on or after December 15 2007, SOX 404(a) 
implemented for non-accelerated filers. After 2007 reform, Dodd-Frank Act permanently exempts 
non-accelerated filers from SOX 404(b) on July 21 2010. 
  
  
 
Figure 1 
Timeline of Regulatory Eventsa 
Before 2007 Reform After 2007 Reform 
11/25/2004 12/15/2007 2007 reform 7/21/2010 
SOX 404(a) and 
SOX(b) implemented 
for accelerated filers 
SOX 404(a) implemented 
for non-accelerated filers 
1. PCAOB replaced AS2 with AS5. Focus on risk; 
expected to reduce audit fees 
Dodd-Frank Act. Permanently 
exempts non-accelerated filers 
from SOX 404(b) 2. SEC management guidance for SOX 404(a) 
 
aThe dates refer to the fiscal year ending on or after that date 
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Chapter 3 
Extant literature and hypothesis 
Regulators have repeatedly postponed the compliance dates for both accelerated and non-
accelerated filers. Concerns over compliance costs–particularly for non-accelerated filers–were 
the primary motivation for each extension. Current research reviews controversial behaviors 
regarding how non-accelerated filers respond to SOX 404(b). Engel, Hayes, and Wang (2007) 
and Leuz, Triantis, and Wang (2008) provide evidence that some firms go dark or private to avoid 
compliance. Moreover, some studies (Gao et al. 2009; Iliev 2010; Nondorf et al. 2012) indicate 
that non-accelerated filers near the public float threshold of $75 million might manipulate their 
public float to retain their non-accelerated status. On the other hand, Cassell, Myers and Zhou 
(2011) document some non-accelerated filers voluntarily adopting SOX 404(b), enjoying a lower 
cost of capital.  This study seeks to explore the net compliance benefit of SOX 404(b) by 
evaluating its benefits and costs. 
3.1. Compliance Cost  
The debate over compliance with Section 404(b) focuses on its costs. However, no 
academic study has documented the specific impact of Section 404(b) on firms’ audit fees. 
Current studies examine the simultaneous effect of Sections 404(a) and 404(b) on audit fees. Both 
regulators and academics document skyrocketing implementation costs associated with Section 
404 during the initial years of implementation (Raghunandan and Rama 2006; Hogan and 
Wilkins 2008; Hoitash et al. 2008; SEC survey(SEC[2009a]); Iliev. 2010; Kinney and 
Shepardson 2011). According to Iliev (2010)’s results, total audit fees increased by 86.6% in the 
first year of compliance. According to an SEC web-based survey, the mean of Section 404(b)’s 
total compliance cost—which includes internal labor cost, audit fees related to ICFR, outside 
vendor fees and non-labor cost—is $2.87 million before 2007 and $2.33 million afterwards. Both 
numbers are higher than the SEC staff’s initial estimate.  
Some studies have examined the effect of AS5 on audit fees (Doogar et al. 2010; 
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Krishnan et al. 2011).2 Using a sample of accelerated filers with clean ICFR opinions that have 
experienced both regulation AS2 and regulation AS5, Doogar, Sivadasan, and Solomon (2010) 
find that AS5 addresses audit fraud risk better than AS2, meanwhile, AS5 leads to lower audit 
fees compared with AS2.3 Krishnan et al. (2011) extend these findings to firms with qualified 
ICFR opinions. Their results suggest that firms’ audit fees are lower in the first two years of AS5 
period than that in the last two years of AS2 period for firms which remediate their internal 
control weaknesses and for firms which receive their first adverse internal control opinion. 
However, their findings do not show that small firms benefit from AS5.  
Collectively, prior studies have provided evidence regarding how SOX 404 affects audit 
fees for accelerated filers at the initial year of compliance. Two concerns exist regarding the 
current evidence. First, no clear empirical evidence demonstrates the link between SOX 404(b) 
and audit fees. Second, the initial implementation year does not provide an efficient estimate of 
compliance costs for SOX404. Therefore, my hypothesis focuses on audit fees: 
H1: Audit fees increase (decrease) for companies that switch from required 
noncompliance (compliance) to compliance (noncompliance) with SOX 404(b). 
3.2. Cost of Debt 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983) illustrate how separation 
between ownership and control raises agency problems previously discussed also construct a 
barrier to the flow of capital. Shareholders largely rely on information disclosed by management. 
The agency and information asymmetry problems affect shareholders’ willingness to provide 
capital. Shareholders expend considerable effort gathering information in order to reduce 
information asymmetry. Meanwhile, shareholders need to monitor management to decrease the 
agency problem. Information-gathering and monitoring management can be extraordinarily costly 
and sometimes infeasible. On the other hand, investors will adjust for these problems when they 
                                                            
2 AS5 refers Auditing Standard NO.5. 
3 AS2 refers Auditing Standard NO.2. 
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provide capital and so request a higher return on capital to offset the risks.  
Prior studies (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Ng and Stoeckenius 1979; Evans 1980; Gjesdal 
1981; Antle 1982, 1984; Datar 1985; Baiman, Evans, and Noel 1987) have modeled the role of 
auditing as a mechanistic monitor. As Jensen and Meckling hypothesize: audit, one type of 
monitoring activity, should mitigate the information asymmetry problem. From theory, cost of 
capital is negatively associated with auditors’ monitoring. 
Current studies have documented the positive relationship between cost of capital and 
information risk (Leftwich 1983; Easley and O’Hara 2004; Yu 2005;  Hribar and Jenkins 2004; 
Francis et al. 2004; Lambert et al. 2007; Kravet and Shevlin 2010; Chen et al. 2010; Lambert et al. 
2011). Particularly, in the theoretical framework of Lambert et al. (2007), the authors demonstrate 
why the quality of accounting information affects the cost of capital. Accounting information 
quality affects firms’ cost of capital because when market participants make an assessment of the 
future cash flow distribution, the variance of firm m’s cash flow and the covariance of firm m’s 
cash flow with the cash flow from all the other firms in the market is positively related to 
accounting information noise and measurement error. The expected return decreases as the 
accounting information noise increases.  
  Meanwhile, extant research suggests that auditors’ assessment of ICFR and 
management’s self-assessment of ICFR improve financial reporting quality (Altamuro and Beatty 
2010; Singer and You 2011). Altamuro and Beatty (2010) find a positive relationship between 
internal control regulation and the quality of financial reporting. Using a control sample of 
Canadian companies which are either cross-listed or only listed on U.S. exchanges, Singer and 
You (2011) find the quality of financial reporting has improved for all complying SOX 404 
accelerated filers compared with the control noncompliance sample. 
Using a sample of propriety data from several large audit firms, Bedard and Graham 
(2011) document the value of auditors’ assessment of ICFR, providing evidence that not only 
auditors do identify about three-fourths of unremediated internal control deficiencies (ICD), but 
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they also set lower thresholds –in other words, they set higher standards for classifying the 
severity of ICD than management does. Their results demonstrate a marginal increase in financial 
reporting quality when auditors provide an assessment of ICFR along with management, 
compared to only management providing one. 
Cassell, Myers, and Zhou (2011) present evidence that companies which voluntary adopt 
SOX 404(b) enjoy lower cost of equity and cost of debt. They measure cost of debt using 
Standard & Poor‘s (S&P) long-term domestic issuer credit rating. Using a sample of privately 
held companies in the United Kingdom, Lennox and Pittman (2011) document that companies 
which voluntary adopt audit assurance services upgrade their credit rating by sending positive 
signals. With the evidence we have currently available, it is impossible to distinguish the value of 
auditor attestation from the effect of positive signals for the voluntary-adopting SOX 404(b) 
companies.   
Collectively, Lambert et al. (2007)’s analytical framework theorizes that high information 
quality should decrease the cost of capital. Theory and empirical evidence (Bedard and Graham 
2011) suggest the monitoring role of auditors enables them to provide higher information quality. 
For two reasons, I predict the cost of debt will increase for companies that switch from 
compliance with SOX 404(b) to noncompliance. First, companies lose any benefit from auditors’ 
attestation value when they cease complying. Second, the market will interpret a negative signal 
when companies discontinue their compliance. These reasons lead to the following hypotheses: 
H2: Credit rating improves (deteriorates) for companies that switch from required 
noncompliance (compliance) to compliance (noncompliance) with SOX 404(b). 
 
3.3 Net Compliance Benefit 
SOX 404 has proven one of the most significant portions of the 2002 SOX Act; and also 
the most controversial. Not surprisingly, extant studies document different firm behaviors toward 
this regulation. Using a sample of firms whose public float are near the threshold at the first year 
of compliance in 2004, Iliev (2010) employs a cross-sectional regression discontinuity design to 
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study how SOX 404 affects the market value. He uses an event study, and two-year returns to 
exploit the net valuation of SOX 404. In the event study, he lists ten events from the 
announcement of the compliance date of SOX 404 in August 2002 to the final date of May 17, 
2005, when the New York Times published on article reporting on the SEC’s desire to trim SOX 
404 costs. While results were somewhat mixed, the majority indicated that the market responds 
negatively toward SOX 404 enforcement. In the two-year (2003-2005) returns study, he 
constructs an equal-weighted long-short portfolio. The portfolio takes a long position on all firms 
required to comply with SOX 404 in 2002, and it shorts all noncompliance firms. The portfolio 
has a negative monthly risk-adjusted return of -0.81% per month. Taken together, studies indicate 
that SOX 404 decreases small firms’ market value. However, the results in Iliev’s study should be 
interpreted with caution because his test period is so restricted. At the initial year of 
implementation, the negative perception of SOX 404 could reflect a transitional value effect 
instead of the real effect. 
In this cost-benefit analysis, I use audit fees and credit rating to proxy the cost and benefit 
of the effect of SOX 404(b), respectively. In the final step, I would like to evaluate the net impact 
of SOX 404(b) after taking consideration of both benefit and cost. In a perfect world, if I could 
calculate the dollar amounts for both the overall costs and benefits, it would be easy to obtain the 
net effect by subtracting the costs from the benefit. However, it is not feasible in reality because 
not all of the costs and benefits data are public available, and some of them are difficult to 
measure.  I need to find a variable to proxy for net compliance benefit.  Tobin’s q is a suitable 
candidate to proxy net compliance benefit because it consists of market valuation and 
reproduction cost. Tobin’s q reflects market value premium. Brainard and Tobin (1968) first 
introduce the concept of Tobin’s q in a static equilibrium financial system model and the name of 
Tobin’s q does not appear until the article “A general equilibrium approach to monetary theory” 
(Tobin 1969). Brainard and Tobin (1968) provide the definition of Tobin’s q as the ratio of 
market valuation of equities to the replacement cost of the physical assets they represent (p103).  
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In theory, a difference in Tobin’s q reflects various market valuations. Tobin and Brainard (1977) 
also provide the rationale behind the theory. In a market, for the same goods, when the value of 
the existing goods exceeds the current cost of producing the identical ones, the value of newly 
produced goods will rise, and it will encourage investment (under the incentive) to gain the 
difference between the market price and reproduced cost. When the ratio is greater than 1, it will 
increase a firm’s market valuation after making new investment because the assets are worth 
more in the market than their costs to produce them. On the contrary, when the Tobin’s q is less 
than 1, it discourages new investment.  
A high Tobin’s q suggests a larger firm value premium because investors assign valuable 
intangible assets in addition to physical assets, such as monopoly power (Lindenberg and Ross 
1981), good will, or sound governance. From the equity valuation model, “Higher values of 
Tobin’s q could reflect differences in expected discount rates and/or differences in expected 
future cash flows” (Daske et al. 2008). Tobin’s q “has been the workhorse of large-sample 
valuation studies” (Gompers et al. 2010). Many corporate finance papers use Tobin’s q to proxy 
firm equity valuation (e.g. Servaes 1991, Lang and Stulz 1994, Daske et al. 2008, Chemmanur et 
al. 2009, Black and Kim 2011). I have not found many accounting studies that have used Tobin’s 
q. However, one example I have found is the study done by Daske et al. (2008). In the study, they 
use Tobin’s q to proxy firm’s value to investigate the economic effects of mandatory adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) around the world. In my study, high Tobin’s 
q suggests high net compliance benefit because investors assign more valuable intangible assets 
to those firms.   
Theoretical arguments predict the relationship between auditors’ assessment of ICFR and 
market valuation of the firm’s asset is that the auditor’s assessment of ICFR will increase the 
firm’s value premium. The rationale behind it is that the auditor assessment should decrease 
information asymmetry between the management and investors, and investors should be more 
confident with the information provided by the management. Investors will assign a high value 
19 
 
premium for firms that have their ICFR audited.  
Intuition suggests that the policymakers who voted in favor of the SOX legislation 
believed the issue would carry a net social benefit.  Economic theory also provides arguments for 
why firm value premium in particular might also improve as a result of SOX 404(b) legislation.  
From theory, SOX 404(b) should reduce information asymmetry between management and 
investors, leading investors to reduce discounts imposed on their valuations. This should also lead 
investors to reduce discounts they impose on their valuations as a result of perceived information 
risk. Thus, I make the following hypothesis: 
H3: Firm net compliance benefits increases (decreases) for companies that switch from 
required noncompliance (compliance) to compliance (noncompliance) with SOX 404(b).  
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Chapter 4 
Research design, model specification, and data 
4.1 Research Design 
To conduct the panel-year regression empirical tests, I identify the key variable of interest 
based on data from Audit Analytics, and divide the sample into two groups depending on firms’ 
SOX 404(b) compliance status: accelerated filer and non-accelerated filer. The key variable 
sox404b represents the compliance status for each firm. Specifically, sox404b = 1 when firms are 
required to comply with SOX 404(b), and sox404b =0 when firms are not. Because all accelerated 
filers required compliance with SOX 404 for the fiscal year ending on or after November 15, 
2004, I set all firms as noncompliance status before the compliance date. According to the 
regulation, a firm’s filing status is measured as the firm’s public float on the last business day of 
the second fiscal quarter. If a firm qualifies for this criterion at the second fiscal quarter, then the 
firm needs to change its filing status from the non-accelerated filer to accelerated filer in the 
annual 10-K filing. The critical change is that as an accelerated filer, the firm needs to comply 
with SOX 404(b) during the same fiscal year, meaning that the firm’s auditor will assess ICFR 
during the year-end audit process. On the other hand, a firm’s filing status can change from an 
accelerated filer to a non-accelerated filer, as well.  When a firm’s public float, measured on the 
last business day of the second fiscal quarter, falls below 50 million, a firm is reclassified as a 
non-accelerated filer and is no longer required to comply with SOX 404(b). Firms disclose their 
filing status as well as their auditors’ ICFR assessment when the auditors assess ICFR on the 10-
K filing.  
My main research goal is to evaluate the average effects of SOX 404(b) for all affected 
firms. The rationale is that auditors’ assessment of ICFR should benefit all assessed firms–no 
matter what the outcome of the assessment of ICFR is. The situation is similar to teachers 
examining their students. After an examination, all students should benefit from learning their 
own weaknesses. Students who get lower scores should benefit more than the students who did 
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extraordinary in the examination because they have more room to improve. Thus, under this 
research goal, I will not control for the outcome of the assessment. This research design is 
consistent with the previously-discussed studies (Altamuro and Beatty, 2010; Iliev, 2010; Singer 
and You 2011). 
 My sample period extends from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2010, during which 
regulators introduced SOX 404 in stages for accelerated filers and non-accelerated filers. Figure 2 
presents the regulatory events and firm filing status. The sample period starts 2002. On 1/1/2002, 
neither the accelerated filer nor the non-accelerated filer implements SOX 404(b), the variable of 
SOX 404b is equal zero for the two groups. Fiscal year ending on or after 11/25/2004, SOX 404(a) 
and SOX 404(b) implemented for accelerated filers. The variable of SOX 404b is equal one for 
the firms whose filing status are accelerated filer, and it is zero for those non-accelerated filers. 
Because firms’ filing status may change annually, the arrows refer to some firms whose filing 
status are non-accelerated in year 2002 change to accelerated filing status in year 2004. The same 
thing happened for the accelerated filers as some firms change their filing status from accelerated 
filers to non-accelerated filers. One thing needs to be mentioned is that during this period, when 
firms change their filing status, they experience not only the change of compliance with SOX 
404(b) but compliance with SOX 404(a) as well. In another words, some firms change from non-
accelerated (accelerated) filer to accelerated (non-accelerated) filer, they need (need not) to 
comply with both SOX 404(a) and SOX 404(b). Fiscal year ending on or after 12/15/2007, SOX 
404(a) implemented for non-accelerated. The last event is on 7/21/2010. The Dodd-Frank Act 
permanently exempts non-accelerated filers from SOX 404(b). An important fact is that after 
2007, all the firms are required to comply with SOX 404(a). So when firms change their filing 
status, they only change compliance with SOX 404(b). In another words, when some firms 
change from non-accelerated filers (accelerated filers) to accelerated (non-accelerated filers), they 
need (need not) to comply with SOX 404(b). All the arrows in the figure demonstrate the possible 
changes of filing status. 
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For the time-series analysis, I use the full sample to test the average SOX 404 effect 
during the nine-year period. Then, between 2007 and 2010, I test the pure effect of SOX 404(b). 
During the sample period of 2002 to November, 15 2007, I test the joint effect of both SOX 404(a) 
and (b). Secondly, for the panel-year analysis, I conduct both fixed-effect (within-effect) and 
between-effect analysis.  
4.2 Model Specification  
I employ a firm-fixed effects model to analyze the effect of SOX 404. The dependent 
variables are the resultant changes to audit fees, credit rating, and Tobin’s q. The variable of 
interest is SOX 404(b) required participation, sox404b. The fixed effects model provides 
consistent estimators in panel data. A firm-fixed effects model has two main advantages over 
other models. First, the classic merit of a fixed effects model is that it addresses the concern of 
omitted correlated variables. Under the setting of my study, the estimators we get from pooled 
OLS or random effects model will be biased if any unobserved firm characteristics—for example, 
firm risk or firm culture—correlate with the variable of interest, sox404b. In other words, 
although SOX 404 regulation is exogenous, there might still be endogeneity issues because 
compliance firms are considered less risky than non-compliance firms, leading to biased 
estimators. The second advantage is that a fixed effects model has unique advantages over other 
models, such as pooled OLS or random effects, particularly for policy analysis and program 
evaluation. Unlike other models, program participation estimates under fixed effects are still 
consistent even when correlated with persistent components in the error term (Wooldridge, 2002).  
In addition to using a firm-fixed effects regression model to control for unobserved time-
invariant firm characteristics, I use year dummies to control for time trends, and include extensive 
control variables to address firm characteristics. In the regressions for audit fees, following prior 
literature (Simunic 1980, Francis 1984,  Davis, Ricchiute, and Trompeter 1993, O’Keefe, 
Simunic, and Stein 1994a, Bell, Landsman, and Shackelford 2001, Hay, Knechel, and Wong 2006, 
Bell, Doogar, and Solomon 2008, Doogar, Sivadasan, and Solomon 2010), I control for auditee 
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size, operating complexity, operating risk, financial risk, and auditee fraud risk. For the credit 
rating regressions, I follow recent studies (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Fortin and Pittman 2007; 
Lennox and Pittman 2011) to control for determinants of credit rating. For the Tobin’s q 
regressions, following extant literature (Daske et al. 2008; Black and Kim 2012), I set extensive 
control variables for firm characteristics that could be correlated with Tobin’s q. Table 1 defines 
the principal variables I study in this paper. 
I use the following firm-fixed effects regression model: 
Dependent Variable = β0 + β1 sox404b + Σβj Controlsj  
Dependent Variable represents the three dependent variables: audit fees, credit rating, 
and Tobin’s q. Sox404b is the regulation participant variable. Sox404b equals 1 if the firm is 
required to receive the auditor's assessment of ICFR in the current year. Controlsj designates three 
sets of control variables, including two-way fixed effects. 
  
 Table 1 
Variable Definition. 
 
Panel A: variables definition for audit fees 
Ln_auditfees 
the natural logarithm of the audit and audit-related fees paid to the firm’s 
auditor. 
Sox404b 
set equal to 1 if the firm is required to comply with Section 404(b), 0 
otherwise. 
Filing 
number of calendar days between the auditee’s fiscal year end and the 10-K 
filing date. 
Big4 
an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor is a Big 4 firm, 0 
otherwise. 
Special 
an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm reports special items(Compustat 
data item SPI); 0 otherwise. 
Lev total liability divided by total asset. 
Restruc 
an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm took a restructuring charge 
(Compustat data item RCP or RCEPS); 0 otherwise. 
Size the natural logarithm of the total assets. 
Roa 
return-on-assets ratio. Calculated as operating income after depreciation, 
divided by total assets. 
Loss 
an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm’s net income is negative, 0 
otherwise. 
Forop an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm reports foreign currency 
translation  value other than 0 (Compustat data item FCA), 0 otherwise. 
Invrec (total receivables + total inventories) / total assets 
Busy 
an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the auditee’s fiscal year ends on 
December or January, 0 otherwise. 
Merger an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the auditee is engaged in a merger or 
acquisition (Compustat data item AQP or AQEPS), 0 otherwise. 
Frsk an indicator variable set equal to 1 if F-score
b  ≥ 1, zero otherwise.  
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 Table 1 (continued) 
Panel B: variables definition for credit rating 
Rating Standard & Poor’s (S&P) long-term domestic issuer credit rating 
(COMPUSTAT data item SPLTICRM), following Jiang (2008), I convert rating 
letters into rating numbers. A smaller number designates a better rating. 
Appendix A provides the conversion table. 
 Ln_age the natural logarithm of the firm’s age in years. 
Ln_sale              the natural logarithm of the firms’ sales. 
Intcov  interest expense divided by earnings before interest and taxation. 
Liquidity  (current assets - inventory) divided by current liabilities. 
 
Panel C:  variables definition for Tobin’s q 
Ln_tobin_q        the natural logarithm of Tobin’s q. It calculates as (AT + ME - BE) / AT  
 
AT: total assets 
 
ME: market value at year-end 
 
BE:  book value of equity. Following Daniel and Titman (1997).  
 
BE= (Stockholders Equity + Deferred Taxes + Investment tax Credit - Preferred 
Stock) 
Salegrowth  percentage change of sales. 
Ppe     ratio of property, plant, and equipment to sales. 
Capital  ratio of capital expenditures to PPE. 
Ebit   ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to sales. 
a I winsorize the top and bottom of one percent of each of the continuous variables 
to mitigate the influence of outliers. 
b F -score = ePV /[0.00345(1 + ePV )]. See note 5 for each of the variable definition. 
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Figure 2 
Regulatory Events and Firm Filing Status 
Before 2007 Reform 
 
After 2007 Reform 
1/1/2002 
 
11/25/2004 
 
12/15/2007 
 
2007 reform 
 
7/21/2010 
 
 
SOX 404(a) and 
SOX(b) 
implemented for 
accelerated filers 
 SOX 404(a) 
implemented for 
non-accelerated 
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1. PCAOB 
replaced AS2 with 
AS5.  
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Chapter 5 
Sample selection 
Appendix B presents the sample selection procedure. I obtain all variables from Audit 
Analytics and Compustat. Audit Analytics is a database provided by an independent company of 
the same name, and researchers in many fields (such as investment, regulation, accounting and 
economics) utilize it intensively. According to Audit Analytics, it covers more than 150,000 
audits from the entire SEC registrar which are conducted by over 10,000 accounting firms. The 
data in Audit Analytics starts from the year 2000, but it does not include a complete set of 2000 
year data. The audit data consists of ten modules: Audit Changes, Auditor Engagements, Audit 
Fees, Audit Options, Benefit Plan Options, D&O Changes, Disclosure Controls, Internal Controls, 
Later Files, and Restatements. I used two modules—the Audit Fees module and the Disclosure 
Controls module—that are critical to my research question. The Audit Fees module includes 
information related to audit fees, such as audit fees and audit-related fees, while the Disclosure 
Controls module provides information regarding filing status of each.  Particularly, under the 
audit fees table, I obtain total audit fees by adding audit fees and audit related fees because the 
separate internal control assessment fees are not required for disclosure. Plus, all audit firms 
conduct integrated financial reporting audits and internal control audits. In another words, 
accelerated-filers always have the same auditor conduct both financial reporting audits and 
internal control audits. 
Compustat includes several datasets, but I use the North America file because I am only 
interested in U.S. companies. The Compustat North America file contains information for 
publicly held companies in both annual and quarterly formats. I acquire all annual financial 
variables using the annual format. 
To identify all firms’ filing status and their SOX 404 compliance status, I review firm 
data in Audit Analytics from 2002 to 2010. I start from 2002, the year firms were first required to 
start disclosing their public floats and filing status on their 10-K filing. 2002 is the earliest date 
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for which filing status is available from Audit Analytics. The initial date for accelerated filers to 
comply with SOX 404(a) and (b) is 2004. I begin my sample two years before the initial 
implementation of SOX 404 and include six years of post-implementation data.  
Using data from Audit Analytics, I first select all U.S. firms that have a filing status 
available from their Form 10-K between the fiscal years 2002 and 2010, resulting in a total 
number of the observations of 58,097. During fiscal years 2002 and 2003, I set all firms as non-
compliance firms because none of the firms is required to comply with SOX 404(b). After 2004, I 
define accelerated filers as the compliance firms. sox404b, the primary variable of interest, is a 
dichotomous measure. When a firm reports its filing status as an accelerated filer, sox404b equals 
1; otherwise, sox404b equals 0. My focus in this study is to examine all the firms that have 
experienced the change of not having their internal control audited to having their auditors assess 
internal control as well as the reverse (from audit to non-audit). The effectiveness of internal 
controls is not the interest of this study, so I do not collect information on the quality of internal 
control. Another advantage of not including an internal control effectiveness variable is that there 
is some missing information for this variable, and not all of the accelerated filers have complete 
internal control effectiveness information on Audit Analytics.  
  I obtain financial variables from Compustat. Following prior studies (Iliev 2010; Singer 
et al. 2011; Krishnan et al. 2012; Nondorf et al. 2012), I exclude financial institutions (two digit 
SIC codes between 60 and 69) because many of these firms are not subject to SOX 404. Those 
financial companies have complied with a similar regulation starting in 1991.4  I exclude 10,490 
firm-year financial companies from the sample.  I identify a sample of 38,496 observations to 
conduct the audit fee analysis. There is much missing credit rating information on Compustat, 
thus 8,034 observations comprise the sample for the analysis of credit rating. The final sample for 
analyzing Tobin’s q includes 30,730 observations. Comparing with audit fee and Tobin’s q 
                                                            
4 The regulation is the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 
(FDICIA). 
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sample, the number of observations in credit rating sample is much less. The fact is that credit 
rating agents usually favor rating big-size companies, and many small-size companies don’t have 
the credit rating information.  
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Chapter 6 
Data and primary results 
6.1 Audit fees 
6.1.1 Regression model and variables 
Figure 3 layouts the research design and analyses for the audit fee analysis. The main 
objective for the 2007 reform is to reduce audit fees, so I conduct the analyses on the pre-2007 
sample and the post-2007 sample. For each part, I conduct both time-series analysis and cross-
sectional analysis. Time-series analysis refers to an analysis of the change on audit fees for the 
firms when they change their compliance status. It is the “firm fixed effect” or “within” model in 
the regression. Cross-sectional analysis refers to analysis difference in means between the two 
groups—accelerated filer and non-accelerated filer. It is the “between” model in the regression 
analyses. The hypothesis for across time analysis is that audit fees increase (decrease) when a 
firm switches from non-accelerated (accelerated) filers to accelerated (non-accelerated) filers. 
The hypothesis for cross section analysis is that accelerated filers’ audit fees are greater than non-
accelerated filers. 
To investigate the effect of SOX 404(b) on audit fees, I examine the following regression 
for three sample periods. The first sample period utilizes the full sample, 2002-2010. The second 
is from 2002-2006, examining the early years of SOX 404, when firms who complied at all would 
comply with both parts (a) and (b). However, from theory, SOX 404(a)–management’s 
assessment of ICFR—should not affect a firm’s external audit fees. I use the third sample period, 
2007-2010, to investigate SOX 404(b) effect on audit fees, and also whether audit fees have 
decreased after the 2007 reform.  
ln_auditfeesit = β0+ β1sox404bit+ β2filingit+β3big4it + β4specialit +  β5levit+β6restrucit + 
β7sizeit+ β8roait+ β9lossit+β10foropit+ β11invrecit + β13 busyit + β14mergerit +β15 frskit + μit   
Where: 
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ln_auditfees = the natural logarithm of the audit and audit-related fees paid to the firm’s 
auditor; 
sox404b = set equal to 1 if the firm is required to comply with Section 404(b), 
      0 otherwise (compliance vs non-compliance filing status); 
 
filing = number of calendar days between the auditee’s fiscal year end and the 10-K 
filing date;  
 
big4 = an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor is a Big 4 firm, 0 
otherwise; 
 
special = an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm reports special items (Compustat 
data item SPI); 0 otherwise; 
 
lev = total liability divided by total asset; 
restruc = an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm took a reconstruction charge 
(Compustat data item RCP or RCEPS); 0 otherwise 
 
size = the natural logarithm of the total assets; 
roa = return-on-assets ratio. Calculated as operating income after depreciation, 
divided by total assets; 
 
loss = an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm’s net income is negative, 0 
otherwise; 
 
forop = an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm reports foreign currency 
translation value other than 0 (Compustat data item FCA), 0 otherwise; 
 
invrec = (total receivables + total inventories) / total assets 
busy = an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the auditee’s fiscal year ends on 
December or January, zero otherwise; 
 
merger = an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the auditee is engaged in a merger or 
acquisition (Compustat data item AQP or AQEPS), zero otherwise; 
 
frsk = an indicator variable set equal to 1 if F -score5 ≥ 1, zero otherwise. This binary 
variable measures the probability of audit fraud risk, from Doogar et al. (2010). 
Dechow et al. (2011) develop this variable. 
                                                            
5 F -score = ePV /[0.00345(1 + ePV )]  
PV = –6.789 + 0.817 Rsst_acc + 3.230 Ch_rec + 2.436 Ch_inv + 0.122 Ch_cs – 0.992 
         Ch_earn + 0.972Issue  
Rsst_acc = [(WCt−WCt−1) + (NCOt−NCOt−1)+(FINt−FINt−1)] ÷[0.5(ATt + ATt−1)]  
WC = [Current Assets ( ACT) – Cash and Short-Term Investments ( CHE)] - [Current 
           Liabilities ( LCT) – Short-Term Debt (DLC)]  
NCO =[Total Assets (AT) – Current Assets (ACT) – Long-Term Investments (IVAO)] – 
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  I model audit fees as a function of auditee size, auditor type, firm and audit complexity, 
firm performance, firm operation risk and financial risk. The dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of the audit and audit-related fees paid to the firm’s auditor. The primary variable of 
interest is sox404b, the binary indicator indicating required compliance with SOX 404(b). It 
captures the effect of SOX 404(b) on audit fees.  
The function of the control variables is to control for other factors that may have an 
association with audit fees except sox404b. The control variables in the above model are as 
follows—filing is the number of calendar days between the auditee’s fiscal year end and the 10-K 
filing date. Ettredge et al. (2006) document that SOX 404 increases significantly in a firm’s filing 
days after control for other things. Meanwhile, changing filing status affects a firm in two ways 
simultaneously: SOX 404(b) of auditor assessment of internal control system and reduction in 10-
K filing deadline. Since December 15, 2006, the SEC requires large accelerated filers, accelerated 
filers and non-accelerated filers to comply with a 60-day, 75-day, and 90-day annual report 
deadline respectively (SEC 2005b). In order to disentangle the filing deadline reduction effect 
from the auditor assessment internal control effect, I include this filing period variable in the 
regression analysis. big4 is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor is a Big 4 firm. 
Raghunandan and Rama (2006), Hogan and Wilkins (2008), Hoitash et al. (2008), Krishnan et al. 
(2011), Hoag and Hollingsworth (2011) have documented that companies having a Big 4 
accounting firm as their auditors are associated with high audit fees. I track whether special items 
are included because Palmrose (1986), Ashbaugh et al. (2003), Krishnan et al. (2011) have 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
           [Total Liabilities ( LT) – Current Liabilities ( LCT) – Long-Term Debt (DLTT)] 
FIN = [Short-Term Investments ( IVST) + Long-Term Investments (IVAO)] - [Long- 
           Term Debt ( DLTT) + Short-Term Debt ( DLC) + Preferred Stock ( PSTK)] 
Ch_rec = [Rect– Rect−1] ÷ [0.5(ATt + ATt−1)]  
Ch_inv = [Invt – Invt−1] ÷ [0.5(ATt + ATt−1)] where Inv is total inventory ( INVT)  
Ch_cs = (CSt – CSt−1/CSt−1) ∗ 100 where CS is sales (SALE) less change in accounts   receivable 
              (RECT)  
Ch_earn = [Earnt ÷ ATt ] – [Earnt−1 ÷ ATt−1] where Earn is earnings ( IB)  
Issue = 1 if firm issued securities during the year ((SSTK) > 0 or (DLTIS) > 0), zero otherwise 
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documented a positive association between audit fees and the existence of special items. I include 
roa, loss and lev to control for firms’ performance. Prior studies (e.g., Palmrose 1986; Ashbaugh 
et al. 2003; Doogar et al. 2010; Krishnan et al. 2011) have shown firms’audit fees are positively 
associated with leverage (lev). Ashbaugh et al. 2003, Francis et al. 2005, and Krishnan et al. 2011 
have documented positive association between a firm’s performance and a firm’s audit fees. 
Following prior studies (Palmrose1986; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Krishnan et al. 2011), I include 
merger and restruc to control for firms’ activity in merger and restructuring.  Prior literature has 
presented remarkably solid evidence that an auditee’s size is highly positively associated with 
audit fees. Following Ashbaugh et al. 2003, Francis et al. 2005, Hogan and Wilkins 2008, and 
Krishnan et al. 2011, I use forop to proxy for a firm’s complexity because they have documented 
a positive association between audit fees and a firm’s complexity. Doogar et al. (2010) and 
Krishnan et al. (2011) have documented invrec is positively associated with audit fees. Doogar et 
al. (2010) also have documented higher audit fees for companies whose fiscal years end in 
December or January, which I include here in the binary variable busy. Finally, I adopt frsk, a 
binary variable to measure the probability of audit fraud, from Doogar et al. (2010). Dechow et al. 
(2011) develop this variable. Doogar et al. (2010) have shown that AS5 audit fees are positively 
associated with frsk.6  
6.1.2 Sample Description 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for audit fees for two groups—compliance group 
(sox404b=1) and non-compliance group (sox404b=0) across two time periods. Panel A reports 
descriptive statistics for the sample period of 2002-2010 and Panel B reports for the sample 
period of 2007-2010. 2002-2010 is the full sample period. However, during the year of 2002 and 
2006, when a firm changes its compliance status, it experiences the change of complying with 
SOX 404(b) and SOX 404(a). During the sample period of 2007-2010, only the change 
                                                            
6 AS5 refers Auditing Standard NO.5. 
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compliance status of SOX 404(b) will be captured because all the firms complied with SOX 
404(a) in 2007. 
 The first row of Panel A in Table 2 shows that the mean (median) of the natural 
logarithm of audit fees for Sox 404b firms is 14.12 (14.04), while the mean (median) for non-Sox 
404b firms is 12.36 (12.32) during the full sample period of 2002 - 2010. The differences in mean 
and median for the two groups are highly significant (p<0.01), and it consistent with a general 
expectation.7 For other control variables, comparing with non-compliance firms, the compliance 
firms are more likely to hire Big 4 auditors, are bigger in terms of total assets, have a better return 
on asset ratio, have a lower of the sum of total receivables and total inventories which is scaled by 
its total assets, more likely to have special items, more likely to take a restructuring charge, have 
lower leverage, less likely to have December or January fiscal year ending date, less likely have 
the  negative income, more likely to occur foreign currency transaction, have higher audit risk, 
have shorter filing period, and more likely to engage in the merger or acquisition activity. All the 
difference in mean and median for the control variables is significant (p<0.01). During the full 
sample period to conduct audit fees analysis, there are 16,858 observations in Sox 404b group, 
and 21,638 in non-Sox 404b group. 
 The first row of Panel B in Table 2 shows that the mean (median) of the natural logarithm 
of audit fees for Sox 404b firms is 14.12 (14.05) while the mean (median) for non-Sox 404b firms 
is 12.28 (12.24) during the sample period of 2007 - 2010. The differences in the mean and median 
for the two groups are highly significant (p<0.01). Compared with the full sample, the mean 
(median) of audit fees for the sample of  2007-2010 sample has decreased for the both groups—
Sox 404b group and non-Sox 404b group. The mean or median difference for the other control 
variables between the two groups is very similar with the sample of 2002-2010. All the 
differences are highly significant. During the sample period of 2007-2010 used to conduct the 
                                                            
7 I use Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test to test median difference for the entire study. 
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audit fees analysis, there are 9,577 observations in Sox 404b group, and 5,961 in non-Sox 404b 
group. 
Table 3 reports Pearson correlation coefficients across all the variables for the full sample 
period of 2002-2010. Consistent with the expectation, ln_auditfees is significantly positively 
correlated with sox404b at 0.001 level. The dependent variable,  ln_auditfees, is significantly 
correlated with all the innate characteristics of firms identified from prior studies (Palmrose1986; 
Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2005; Ettredge et al. 2006; Raghunandan and Rama 2006; 
Hogan and Wilkins 2008; Hoitash et al. 2008; Doogar et al. 2010; Krishnan et al. 2011; Hoag and 
Hollingsworth 2011). Meanwhile, sox404b is significantly positively correlated with big4, size, 
roa, special, restruc, busy, and merge at 0.001 level, and it is significantly negatively correlated 
at 0.001 level with invrec, lev, loss and filing.  
Table 4 presents Pearson correlation coefficients for the sample period of 2002-2006. All 
the correlations are identical with the correlations from the full sample. ln_auditfees is 
significantly positively correlated with sox404b. Sox404b is significantly positively correlated 
with big4, size, roa, special, restruc, busy, and merge, and it is significantly negatively correlated 
with invrec, lev, loss and filing.  
Table 5 shows Pearson correlation coefficients for the sample period of 2007-2010. All 
the correlations are indistinguishable with both the correlations from the full sample and the 
correlations from the pre-2007 sample. ln_auditfees is significantly positively correlated with 
sox404b. Sox404b is significantly positively correlated with big4, size, roa, special, restruc, busy, 
and merge, and it is significantly negatively correlated with invrec, lev, loss and filing. 
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6.1.3 Regression Results 
Table 6 reports within and between regressions for the sample of 2002-2006. The within 
estimator provides a consistent estimate of the fixed effects model.8 A Hausman test on 
untabulated results yields an overall statistic of p=0.000. This leads to rejecting the random 
effects model. Year of 2002 - 2006 is the pre-2007 reform sample period. The expectation is that 
there is a significant increase in audit fees. Model 2 in table 4, within model, is the main 
regression model. The coefficient on the variable sox404b in model 2 measures the audit fees 
difference during sample year of 2002 to 2006 for firms that have changed their compliance 
status of SOX 404.9 The coefficient is positive (0.491), and highly significant (p<0.01). 
Economically, this suggests that during 2002 to 2006, holding all else equal, when a firm changes 
from noncompliance to compliance, it experiences an average increase in audit fees of 63%. This 
is consistent with my prediction that audit fees increase after firms comply with SOX 404(b). 
However, the increase in audit fees could be partly due to SOX 404(a) because when the firm 
changed its compliance status during 2002 to 2006, it had to comply with SOX 404(b) and SOX 
404(a). Obviously, this is before the 2007 reform period, and the increase in audit fees is 
particularly dramatic as expected. Model 1 is estimated by using only variable sox404b. The 
result is highly consistent with the results in Model 2. The coefficient is positive (0.536), and 
highly significant (p<0.01). The fact that the result is remarkably consistent in the model with or 
without control variables indicates that the result is unlikely affected by other independent 
variables. Model 4 in Table 4 is estimated by using the between regression approach. The 
between estimator uses levels or cross-section variations of the data. The coefficient on the 
variable sox404b in model 4 measures the difference in audit fees during sample year of 2002 to 
2006 between firms that have complied with SOX 404(b) or not. The coefficient on the variable 
sox404b in Model 4 is positive (0.562), and highly significant (p<0.01). Model 3 provides the 
                                                            
8 I also run OLS, firm random effects regressions to conduct audit fees analysis; results are 
similar in all cases. 
9 It includes SOX 404(a) and SOX 404(b).  
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between regression result after dropping all the control variables. The coefficient on the variable 
sox404b in Model 3 is positive (3.078), and highly significant (p<0.01). In summary, results in 
Table 4 provide consistent evidence that SOX 404(b) increases audit fees. 
Table 7 reports estimates for within and between regressions for the sample period of 
2007 to 2010. My main variable of interest, the auditor assessment of internal control variable, 
sox404b, is positively related to audit fees (t statistics = 4.93), supporting H1 and suggesting that 
firms with an auditor assessment internal control have higher audit fees. The economic magnitude 
of the coefficient on sox404b is also significant. The coefficient is 0.078. The results show that 
during 2007 – 2010, holding other known determinants of audit fees equal, when a firm changes 
from noncompliance to compliance, it experiences an average increase in audit fees of 8.1%. 
Compared with the percentage increases of 63% before 2007, it clearly suggests that after the 
2007 reform, audit fees associated with compliance cost dramatically decreased. One observation 
is that compared with other studies (Iliev 2010; Kinney 2011), the magnitude of the increase in 
audit fees from the above analysis is substantially lower than from the other studies. One 
significant difference is that the sample period in this study is after the 2007 reform, and it 
includes four years of post-reform data, in which we can isolate the effects of SOX 404(b) from 
404(a). In both Iliev 2010 and Kinney 2011 they only focus on the initial year of SOX 404(a) and 
(b). Another possible source of the differing results is that I use firm fixed-effects analysis, which 
uses the firm itself as the control. Turning to the control variables, except for lev, busy, and forop, 
the rest of the other control variables that I identified from the prior audit fees literature are 
significant in the expected direction. The results suggest that high audit fees are associated with 
firms which are more likely audited by Big4 accounting firms, are large, have high firm 
performance (measured as high roa and low loss), have more high-risk accounts (invrec), present 
special items (special), engaged in Merger & Acquisition and restructuring activities (merger and 
restruc respectively), have a high probability of audit fraud (frsk), and long filing date (filing). 
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Figure 4 provides audit fees analysis research design, table of results, and result summary. 
For the pre-2007 analysis, the result of “within” analysis in Table 6 suggests the audit fee 
increases (decreases) dramatically when a firm changes from a non-accelerated filer (accelerated 
filer) to accelerated filer (non-accelerated filer). The result of “between” analysis in Table 6 
suggests that accelerated filer audit fees are greater than non-accelerated filer. For after-2007 
analysis, the result of “within” analysis in Table 7 suggests the audit fee increases (decreases) 
when a firm changes from a non-accelerated filer (accelerated filer) to accelerated filer (non-
accelerated filer). The result of “between” analysis in Table 7 suggests that accelerated filer audit 
fees are greater than non-accelerated filer. 
6.2 Credit Rating 
6.2.1 Regression model and variables 
I employ the following regression model to investigate the effect of SOX 404(b) on credit 
rating for the two sample periods. First, I use a sample period of 2002 to 2010. Then I use a 
sample period of 2007 to 2010. Because I am interested in the pure SOX 404(b) period, the 
sample period of 2007 to 2010 is my main sample period. 
 
ratingit = β0+ β1sox404bit+ β2ln_ageit+β3big4it + β4sizeit +  β5ln_salet+β6intcovit + β7 
liquiditytit+ β8levit + μit   
Where: 
 
Rating = Standard & Poor’s (S&P) long-term domestic issuer credit rating 
(COMPUSTAT data item SPLTICRM), following prior studies (e.g., Minton and 
Schrand 1999; Ahmed et al. 2002; Jiang 2008; Cassell et al. 2011), I convert 
rating letters into rating numbers. A smaller number designates a better rating. 
Appendix A provides the conversion table. 
 
sox404b = an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm is required to comply with 
Section 404(b), 0 otherwise; 
 
ln_age  = the natural logarithm of the firm’s age in years; 
 
big4 = an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor is a Big 4 firm, 0 
otherwise; 
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size  = the natural logarithm of the firms’ total assets;  
ln_sale  = the natural logarithm of the firms’ sales; 
intcov  = interest expense divided by earnings before interest and taxation  
liquidity = (current assets - inventory) divided by current liabilities 
 
lev  = total liability divided by total asset 
 
Following prior studies (e.g., Minton and Schrand 1999; Ahmed et al. 2002; Jiang 2008; 
Cassell et al. 2011), I obtain the dependent variable, rating, from Standard & Poor’s (S&P) long-
term domestic issuer credit rating.  I convert rating letters into rating numbers, with a smaller 
number designates a better rating. Following prior studies (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; 
Fortin and Pittman 2007; Lennox and Pittman 2011), I include the variable of interest coverage, 
intov, which is measured as interest expense divided by earnings before interest and taxes. A 
lower intov indicates greater interest coverage. Prior literature (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; 
Fortin and Pittman 2007; Lennox and Pittman 2011) has documented that higher sales, company 
age, company size and lower leverage are all associated with better credit rating. Thus, I include 
liquidity, ln_sale, ln_age, size, lev as control variables in the analysis. Additionally, I include an 
audit type variable (big4) because Pittman and Fortin (2004) and Cassell et al. (2011) have 
suggested that firms that have Big 4 auditors are associated with a better credit rating.  
Figure 5 presents research design and analysis for credit rating. The analysis is conducted 
in two periods: full period of 2002-2010 and post 2007 period of 2007-2010. For each period, I 
conduct both across time analysis and cross section analysis. The across time analysis is to 
analyze the change in credit rating when a firm changes its compliance status. The hypothesis for 
across time analysis is that when a firm switches from non-accelerated (accelerated) filer to 
accelerated (non-accelerated) filer, its credit rating improves (deteriorates). The cross section 
analysis is to analyze the difference in means between accelerated-filer and non-accelerated filer. 
The hypothesis for cross section analysis is that accelerated filer has better credit rating than non-
accelerated filer.    
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6.2.2 Sample Description 
 
Table 8 reports descriptive statistics of the credit rating sample for two groups—
compliance group (sox404b=1) and non-compliance group (sox404b=0). Panel A reports 
descriptive statistics for the sample period of 2002-2010 and Panel B reports for the sample 
period of 2007-2010. 2002-2010 is the entire sample period. As I mentioned before, the sample 
period of 2007-2010 captures the pure SOX 404(b), and the sample period of 2002 – 2010 
captures SOX 404 effect.  
 The first row of Panel A in Table 8 shows that the mean (median) of credit rating for Sox 
404b firms is 10.69 (11.00) while the mean (median) for non-Sox 404b firms is 10.9 (11.00). The 
difference in mean and median for the two groups are highly significant (p<0.01), and it is 
consistent with my expectation—Sox 404b firms experience a better credit rating. For other 
control variables, comparing with non-compliance firms, the compliance firms have better 
liquidity, generate larger sales, are older in terms of years they list on the Compustat, and are 
larger in terms of the total assets. The mean (median) of intcov for Sox 404b firms is 0.84 (0.47), 
which is smaller than non-Sox 404b firms—which is 0.92(0.51). The difference in the mean of 
intcov between the two groups is highly significant (p<0.01).  The mean (median) of Big4 
variable for Sox 404b firms is 0.97 (1.00), and non-Sox 404b firms have the same mean and 
median for variable of Big4. Except for the variable intcov (interest coverage) and Big4, all the 
differences in mean and median for the control variables are highly significant (p<0.01).  
 The first row of Panel B in Table 8 shows, during the sample period of 2007 to 2010, the 
mean (median) of credit rating for Sox 404b firms is 10.74 (11.00) while the mean (median) for 
non-Sox 404b firms is 14.13 (15.00). The differences in mean and median for the two groups are 
highly significant (p<0.01). The mean and median differences show that Sox 404b firms 
experience better credit rating than non-Sox 404b firms. The mean (median) of intcov for Sox 
404b firms is 0.8386 (0.45), which is greater than that of non-Sox 404b firms—which is 0.73 
(0.23). The difference in mean is not statistically significant, and the difference in median is 
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highly statistically significant (p<0.01). Turning to other control variables, as I expect, Sox 404b 
firms have greater liquidity than non-Sox 404b firms—the mean (median) of liquidity is 2952.88 
(1166.1) for Sox 404b firms, and it is 681.62 (248.65) for non-Sox 404b firms. Sox 404b firms 
have larger sales than non-Sox 404b firms—the mean (median) of ln_sale is 8.13 (8.08) for Sox 
404b firms, and it is 6.69 (6.55) for non-Sox 404b firms. Sox 404b firms are older than non-Sox 
404b firms—the mean (median) of ln_age is 3.17 (3.18) for Sox 404b firms, and it is 2.27 (2.20) 
for non-Sox 404b firms. Sox 404b firms are larger than non-Sox 404b firms—the mean (median) 
of ln_at is 8.39 (8.28) for Sox 404b firms, and it is 7.06 (6.60) for non-Sox 404b firms. Sox 404b 
firms have better leverage than that of non-Sox 404b firms—the mean (median) of lev is 0.62 
(0.62) for Sox 404b firms, and it is 0.72 (0.75) for non-Sox 404b firms. Finally, Sox 404b firms 
more likely hire Big4 auditors than non-Sox 404b firms do—the mean (median) of Big4  is 3.17 
(3.18) for Sox 404b firms, and it is 2.27 (2.20) for non-Sox 404b firms. The differences in mean 
and median for the two groups are highly significant (p<0.01). 
Table 9 reports Pearson correlation coefficients across all the variables during the full 
sample period of 2002-2010. As expected, the rating variable is negatively correlated with 
sox404b variable at 0.01 level. It indicates that auditor assessment of internal control is positively 
correlated with a better credit rating. Consistent with prior literature, firms which have Big 4 
accounting firms as their auditors, older firms, large firms (measured as total assets and annual 
sales), firms with high liquidity, and firms with lower leverage have better credit ratings. Rating 
is negatively correlated with big4, ln_age, size, ln_sale and liquidity at 0.001 level. One exception 
is that interest coverage variable, intcov, is not significantly correlated with credit rating. Thus, 
SOX 404(b) firms are older, larger, have high sales volume, possess better liquidity and have 
lower leverage. 
Table 10 presents Pearson correlation coefficients across all the variables for the sample 
period of 2007-2010. As expected, the rating variable is negatively correlated with sox404b 
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variable. Identical with correlations from the full sample, Rating is negatively correlated with 
big4, ln_age, size, ln_sale and liquidity. Rating is positively correlated with intcov and lev.    
6.2.3 Regression Results 
Table 11 reports two models of within regressions and two models of between 
regressions for the entire sample of 2002-2010.10 The full sample period is nine years. The within 
estimator provides a consistent estimate of the fixed effects model. A Hausman test on 
untabulated results yields an overall statistic of p=0.000. This leads to rejecting the random 
effects model. Model 2 in table 11, within model, is the main regression model. The coefficient 
on the variable sox404b in model 2 measures the credit rating difference during sample year of 
2002 to 2010 for firms that have changed their compliance status of SOX 404. The coefficient is 
negative (-0.26), and highly significant (p<0.01). The result suggests that after a firm changes its 
compliance status from non-Sox 404 firm to Sox 404 firm; it receives a better credit rating. This 
is consistent with my prediction that firms’ cost of debt decrease after firms comply with SOX 
404(b).  However, the decreases in credit rating could be partly due to SOX 404(a) since when 
the firm changed their compliance status during 2002 to 2006, they had to comply with SOX 
404(b) and SOX 404(a). Model 1 is estimated by using only variable sox404b. The result is 
highly consistent with the results in Model 2. The coefficient is negative (-0.407), and highly 
significant (p<0.01). The fact that the results are very consistent in the models with or without 
control variables indicates that the result is unlikely affected by some extraneous independent 
variables. Model 4 in Table 11 is estimated by using between regression. The between estimator 
uses levels or cross-section variations of the data. The coefficient on the variable sox404b in 
model 4 measures the difference in credit rating during sample year of 2002 to 2010 between 
firms that have complied with SOX 404(b) and the firms have not. The coefficient on the variable 
of sox404b in Model 4 is positive (0.465), and it is not significant (t=1.31). Model 3 provides the 
between regression result after dropping all the control variables. The coefficient on the variable 
                                                            
10 I also conduct OLS and firm random effects regressions; results are similar in all cases. 
43 
 
sox404b in Model 3 is negative (-3.815), and highly significant (p<0.01). In summary, results in 
Table 11 provide evidence that SOX 404 decrease cost of debt. Turning to other control variables, 
in Model 2, the coefficient on the variable intcov is positive (0.127), and it is highly significant 
(p<0.001). In Model 4, the coefficient on the variable intcov is positive (0.517), and it is highly 
significant (p<0.001). The coefficient on the variable liquidity in Model 4 is negative  
(-0.0000669), and it is highly significant (p<0.01). However, it is not significant in Model 2. The 
coefficient on ln_sale in Model 2 is negative (-0.560), and it is highly significant (p<0.001), while 
in Model 4, it is negative (-0.989), and it is highly significant (p<0.001). The coefficient on 
ln_age in Model 2 is negative (-0.473), and it is significant (p<0.05), while in Model 4, it is 
negative (-1.08), and it is highly significant (p<0.001). The coefficient on lev in Model 2 is 
positive (3.740), and it is highly significant (p<0.001) while in Model 4, it is positive (4.439), and 
it is significant (p<0.001). The coefficients on size and big4 are not significant in both models. 
 Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Lennox and Pittman 2011), the results in the two 
regression models suggest that firms have better credit rating when they have higher interest 
coverage (intcov), higher liquidity (liquidity), higher sales (ln_sale), lower leverage (lev), and 
they are usually older (ln_age). Furthermore, I separate the whole sample into two subsamples—
investment grade (BBB- or above) and non-investment grade sample. Untabulated results show 
the coefficient on Sox404b is negative (-0.00056), and it is not significant for the investment 
grade sample; the coefficient on Sox404b is negative (-0.29), and it is highly significant (p<0.001) 
for the non-investment grade sample. This fact indicates that the non-investment grade 
observations drive the result. 
Table 12 reports within and between regressions for the sample period of 2007 to 2010. 
My main variable of interest, the auditor assessment of internal control variable, sox404b, is 
negatively related to credit rating (t statistics = -3.64), supporting H2 and suggesting an auditor’s 
assessment of internal control is associated with better credit rating. The economic magnitude of 
the -0.429 coefficient on sox404b is also significant. The results show that during 2007 – 2010, 
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holding other known determinants of credit rating equal, when a firm changes from 
noncompliance to compliance; it experiences an average upgrade in credit rating of 0.43 point. 
Turning to other variables, credit rating is positively related to intcov (t statistics = 2.08), 
suggesting lower interest expense coverage is associated with worse credit rating. Credit rating is 
negatively related to ln_sale (t statistics = -2.08) and size (t statistics = -2.84), suggesting large 
firms are associated with better credit rating. Finally, credit rating, is positively related to lev (t 
statistics = 7.76), suggesting lower leverage is associated with better credit rating. Year effect is 
also included in the model. Except for the insignificant coefficients for liquidity, ln_age, and big4, 
all the other coefficients are consistent with prior studies (e.g., Lennox and Pittman 2011). One 
possible explanation for this is that big4’s within variation of 0.0783 is too small to be estimated 
consistently.  
Figure 6 presents research design, tables of results, and result summary for credit rating. 
For the across time analysis, the inference from Table 11 within analysis of full period sample 
and from Table 12 within analysis of post 2007 sample is that the credit rating improves 
(deteriorates) when a firm switches from non-accelerated filer (accelerated filer) to accelerated 
filer (non-accelerated filer). The inference is consistent with the hypothesis. For the cross section 
analysis, the inference of post 2007 period from Table 12 between analysis is that the accelerated 
filer has better credit rating than non-accelerated filer. However, the inference of full sample 
shows that there is no significant difference between the two groups from the full period sample. 
This inference from the cross section analysis is mixed. 
6.3 Tobin’s q 
6.3.1 Regression model and variables 
I follow the regression models used by Daske et al. (2008) and Black and Kim (2012) to 
investigate the effect of SOX 404(b) on Tobin’s q under two sample periods. First, I use a sample 
period of 2002 to 2010. Then I use a sample period of 2007 to 2010. The results from the sample 
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period of 2007 to 2010 are my main focus because I am interested in the effect of SOX 
404(b)isolated from that of 404(a). 
Ln_tobin_qit = β0+ β1sox404bit+ β2ln_ageit+β3sizet + β4levit + β5salegrowthit+β6ppeit+ 
β7capitalit + β8mergerit + β9ebitit + μit   
Where: 
 
Ln_tobin_q = the natural logarithm of Tobin’s q. It is calculated as (AT + ME - BE) / AT  
AT: total assets 
ME: market value of equity at year-end 
BE:  book value of equity. Following Daniel and Titman (1997),  
BE= (Stockholders Equity + Deferred Taxes + Investment Tax  
        Credit - Preferred Stock) 
Salegrowth= percentage change of sales; 
Ppe = ratio of property, plant, and equipment to sales; 
Capital = ratio of capital expenditures to PPE; 
Ebit = ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to sales; 
Tobin’s q is the ratio of the market value of assets to their book value. Market  
value of assets is estimated by adding the book value of debt and market value of equity. 
Following Daniel and Titman (1997), book value of equity is estimated by Stockholders Equity + 
Deferred Taxes + Investment Tax Credit - Preferred Stock. I include firm age, which is measured 
as the natural logarithm of the firm’s age, firm size measured as the natural logarithm of the 
firm’s total assets, sales growth measured as the percentage change of sales, fixed assets intensity 
(the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to sales), capital expenditure measured as the ratio of 
capital expenditures to PP&E, and earnings measured as the ratio of earnings before interest and 
taxes to sales as control variables in the model because prior studies (e.g., Black et al. 2006; 
Black and Kim 2012) have documented that Tobin’s q is negatively associated with firm size, age, 
fixed assets intensity, and earnings.  
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 Figure 7 outlines the research design and analysis for Tobin’s q. Using the same 
methodology, I conduct across time analysis and cross section analysis for two sample periods—
full period of 2002 – 2010 and post 2007 period. The analysis for across time is to analyze change 
in Tobin’s q, and the hypothesis for it is when a firm switches from non-accelerated (accelerated) 
filer to accelerated (non-accelerated0 filer, Tobin’s q increases (decreases). The analysis for cross 
section is to analyze the difference in means between accelerated filer and non-accelerated filer, 
and the hypothesis for it is that accelerated filer has higher Tobin’s q than non-accelerated filer. 
6.3.2 Sample Description 
 
Table 13 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used to conduct the Tobin’s q 
analysis for two groups—the compliance group (sox404b=1) and the non-compliance group 
(sox404b=0). The compliance group is the treatment group, and non-compliance group is the 
control group. Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the sample period of 2002-2010 and Panel 
B reports descriptive statistics for the sample period of 2007-2010. 2002-2010 is the full sample 
period. However, during the year of 2002 and 2006, when a firm changes its compliance status, it 
experiences the change of complying with SOX 404(b) and SOX 404(a). During the sample 
period of 2007-2010, only the change in compliance status of SOX 404(b) will be captured 
because all the firms complied with SOX 404(a) in 2007. 
 The first row of Panel A in Table 13 shows, during the sample period of 2002-2010, the 
mean (median) of the natural logarithm of Tobin’s q for Sox 404b firms is 0.55 (0.46) while the 
mean (median) for non-Sox 404b firms is 0.44 (0.33). The differences in mean and median for the 
two groups are highly significant (p<0.01), and consistent with my expectation. Turning to other 
control variables, comparing with non-compliance firms, the compliance firms have lower sales 
growth (salegrowth), are bigger (size), have higher leverage (lev), have a lower ratio of tangible 
assets to sales (ppe), have less capital expenditure (capital), have higher operating profit margin 
(ebit), are more likely involved in merger and acquisition activities (merger), and are older 
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(ln_age). Except for the mean difference for ppe, all the differences in mean and median for the 
control variables are highly significant (p<0.01).  
 The first row of Panel B in Table 13 shows, during the sample period of 2007 to 2010, 
the mean (median) of log Tobin’s q for Sox 404b firms is 0.47 (0.37) while the mean (median) for 
non-Sox 404b firms is 0.35 (0.20). The difference in mean and median for the two groups are 
highly significant (p<0.01). The mean and median differences show that Sox 404b firms have 
higher Tobin’s q than non-Sox 404b firms. The mean (median) of salegrowth for Sox 404b firms 
is 0.20 (0.07), which is smaller than that of non-Sox 404b firms—which is 0.74 (0.11). Sox 404b 
firms are bigger in terms of the total assets than non-Sox 404b firms—the mean (median) of size 
is 6.74 (6.63) for Sox 404b firms, and it is 3.74 (3.69) for non-Sox 404b firms. Sox 404b firms 
have higher leverage (lev) than non-Sox 404b firms—the mean (median) of lev is 0.48 (0.48) for 
Sox 404b firms, and it is 0.45 (0.42) for non-Sox 404b firms. Sox 404b firms appear to have 
lower capital expenditures than non-Sox 404b firms—the mean (median) of capital is 0.20 (0.02) 
for Sox 404b firms, and it is 2.11 (0.62) for non-Sox 404b firms. Sox 404b firms have higher 
earnings than non-Sox 404b firms—the mean (median) of ebit is -0.34 (0.12) for Sox 404b firms, 
and it is -1.29 (0.03) for non-Sox 404b firms. Sox 404b firms are more likely involved in 
Merger&Acquisition activities than non-Sox 404b firms do—the mean (median) of merger is 
0.14 (0) for Sox 404b firms, and it is 0.07 (0) for non-Sox 404b firms. Finally, Sox 404b firms are 
older than non-Sox 404b firms—the mean (median) of ln_age is 2.81 (2.77) for Sox 404b firms, 
and it is 2.45 (2.56) for non-Sox 404b firms. All the differences in mean and median for the two 
groups are highly significant (p<0.01). 
6.3.3 Regression Results 
Table 14 reports two models of within regressions and two models of between 
regressions for the Tobin’s q analysis for the entire sample of 2002-2010.11 All t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors. The within estimator provides a consistent estimate of the fixed 
                                                            
11 I also conduct OLS and firm random effects regressions; results are similar in all cases. 
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effects model. A Hausman test on untabulated results yields an overall statistic of p=0.000. This 
leads to rejecting the random effects model. Model 2 in table 14, within model, is the main 
regression model. The coefficient on the variable sox404b in model 2 measures the difference in 
Tobin’s q during sample year of 2002 to 2010 for firms that have changed their compliance status 
for SOX 404. The coefficient is positive (0.0817), and highly significant (p<0.001). The result 
suggests that after a firm changes its compliance status from non-Sox 404 firm to Sox 404 firm, 
its Tobin’s q increases. This is consistent with my prediction that the firms’ market value 
premium increases after firms comply with SOX 404(b). Economically, the result suggests, 
during 2002-2010, when a firm changes from noncompliance to compliance status, it experiences 
an average increase in Tobin’s q of 8.51%. As mentioned before, the increase in Tobin’s q could 
be partly due to SOX 404(a) because when a firm changed their compliance status during 2002 to 
2006, they had to comply with SOX 404(b) and SOX 404(a). Model 1 is estimated by using only 
variable sox404b. The coefficient is negative (-0.0066), and insignificant. Model 4 in table 14 is 
estimated by using a between regression approach. The between estimator uses levels or cross-
section variations of the data. The coefficient on the variable sox404b in model 4 measures the 
difference in Tobin’s q during the sample year of 2002 to 2010 between firms that have complied 
with SOX 404(b) and the firms have not. The coefficient on the variable of sox404b in Model 4 is 
positive (0.668), and it is highly significant (p<0.001). Model 3 provides the between regression 
result after dropping all the control variables. The coefficient on the variable sox404b in Model 3 
is positive (0.144), and highly significant (p<0.001). In summary, results in Table 14 provide 
evidence that SOX 404 increases Tobin’s q. Turning to other control variables, in Model 2 the 
coefficient on the variable salegrowth is positive (0.073), and it is highly significant (p<0.001). In 
Model 4, the coefficient on the variable salegrowth is positive (0.17), and it is highly significant 
(p<0.001). The coefficient on the variable size in Model 4 is negative (-0.16), and it is highly 
significant (p<0.001). In Model 2, the coefficient on the variable size is negative (-0.07), and it is 
highly significant (p<0.001). The coefficient on lev in Model 2 is positive (0.04), and it is 
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insignificant (t=1.30), while in Model 4, it is negative (-0.99), and it is highly significant (p<0.01). 
The coefficient on ppe in Model 2 is negative (-0.02), and it is highly significant (p<0.001) while 
in Model 4, it is negative (-0.03), and it is highly significant (p<0.001). The coefficient on capital 
in Model 2 is positive (0.01), and it is not significant (t=1.84) while in Model 4, it is positive 
(0.02), and it is significant (p<0.001). The coefficient on ebit in Model 2 is negative (-0.01), and 
it is highly significant (p<0.001) while in Model 4, it is negative (-0.03), and it is highly 
significant (p<0.001). The coefficient on merger in Model 2 is negative (-0.02), and it is highly 
significant (p<0.001) while in Model 4, it is negative (-0.05), and it is not significant (t=-1.34). 
The coefficient on ln_age in Model 2 is negative (-0.06), and it is significant (p<0.05) while in 
Model 4, it is negative (-0.02), and it is not significant (t=-1.83).   
Table 15 reports within and between regressions for the sample period of 2007 to 2010. 
All regressions use year dummies, and all t-statistics are based on robust standard errors. My 
main variable of interest, the assessment internal control variable sox404b is positively related to 
Tobin’s q (t statistic = 4.48), supporting H3 and suggesting firms which obtain an auditor’s 
assessment of internal controls have higher Tobin’s q. The coefficient of sox404b is .0827. 
Economically, the result shows that during 2007 – 2010, holding all else equal, when a firm 
switches from noncompliance to compliance, it experiences an average increase in Tobin’s q of 
8.63%. It is significant at the 0.001 level. Turning to other coefficients; salegrowth is positively 
related to Tobin’s q (t statistics = 8.44), suggesting high sales growth associated with high 
Tobin’s q. Size is negatively related to Tobin’s q (t statistics = -13.52), suggesting small firms are 
associated with high Tobin’s q. Leverage is positively associated with Tobin’s q (t statistics = 
4.18), suggesting high leverage firms are associate with high Tobin’s q. Ppe is negatively 
associated with Tobin’s q (t statistics = -2.78), indicating firms with less property, plant and 
equipment are associated with high Tobin’s q. Finally, merger is negatively associated with 
Tobin’s q (t statistics = -2.93), suggesting firms involved in merger and acquisition activities are 
associated with low Tobin’s q. 
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Figure 8 presents Tobin’s q research design, tables of results, and result summary. For 
across time analysis, inferences from Table 14 for the full period and inference from Table 15 for 
the post 2007 period show that when a firm switches from non-accelerated (accelerated) filer to 
accelerated (non-accelerated) filer, its Tobin’s q increases (decreases). The inferences from the 
across time analysis are consistent with the hypothesis. For the cross section analysis, the 
inferences from Table 14 for the full period and inferences from Table 15 for the post 2007 
period show that an accelerated filer has a higher Tobin’s q than a non-accelerated filer. The 
inferences from cross section analysis are consistent with the hypothesis. 
6.4. Overall inferences 
Figure 9 presents a summary of my hypotheses and inferences for this study. The 
hypothesis for audit fees is that audit fees increase (decrease) for companies that switch from 
required noncompliance (compliance) to compliance (noncompliance) with SOX 404(b). The 
inference is that compliance cost increases (decreases) for companies that switch from required 
noncompliance (compliance) to compliance (noncompliance) with SOX 404(b). The hypothesis 
for credit rating is that credit rating improves (deteriorates) for companies that switch from 
required noncompliance (compliance) to compliance (noncompliance) with SOX 404(b). The 
inference is that the cost of debt decreases (increases) for companies that switch from required 
noncompliance (compliance) to compliance (noncompliance) with SOX 404(b). The hypothesis 
for Tobin’s q is that Tobin’s q increase (decrease) for companies that switch from required 
noncompliance (compliance) to compliance (noncompliance) with SOX 404(b). The inference is 
that firm net compliance benefit increase (decrease) for companies that switch from required 
noncompliance (compliance) to compliance (noncompliance) with SOX 404(b). All the 
inferences are consistent with the hypothesis.
 
 
Table 2 
 Descriptive Statistics. 
Panel A: 2002 - 2010 
Variable 
Mean p-value 
for 
Difference 
Median p-value 
for 
Difference 
n 
Sox404b=0 Sox404b=1 Sox404b=0 Sox404b=1 Sox404b=0 Sox404b=1 
Ln_auditfees 12.3618 14.1247 <0.01 12.32 14.04 <0.01 21638 16858 
Big4 0.5378 0.8423 <0.01 1 1 <0.01 21638 16858 
Size 4.0923 6.6403 <0.01 4.07 6.52 <0.01 21638 16858 
Roa -0.4788 0.0226 <0.01 0.02 0.07 <0.01 21638 16858 
Invrec 0.2621 0.228 <0.01 0.21 0.2 <0.01 21638 16858 
Special 0.5549 0.6994 <0.01 1 1 <0.01 21638 16858 
Restruc 0.1918 0.3293 <0.01 0 0 <0.01 21638 16858 
Lev 1.1473 0.5145 <0.01 0.54 0.49 <0.01 21638 16858 
Busy 0.6863 0.762 <0.01 1 1 <0.01 21638 16858 
Loss 0.5312 0.2945 <0.01 1 0 <0.01 21638 16858 
Forop 0.1612 0.3 <0.01 0 0 <0.01 21638 16858 
Frsk 0.7065 0.7673 <0.01 1 1 <0.01 21638 16858 
Filing 87.5127 67.8267 <0.01 88 67 <0.01 21638 16858 
Merger 0.0387 0.1022 <0.01 0 0 <0.01 21638 16858 
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 Table 2 (continued) 
Panel B: 2007 - 2010 
Variable 
Mean p-value 
for 
Difference 
Median p-value 
for 
Difference 
n 
Sox404b=0 Sox404b=1 Sox404b=0 Sox404b=1 Sox404b=0 Sox404b=1 
Ln_auditfees 12.2805 14.1231 <0.01 12.24 14.05 <0.01 5961 9577 
Big4 0.2921 0.8241 <0.01 0 1 <0.01 5961 9577 
Size 3.5104 6.7239 <0.01 3.53 6.62 <0.01 5961 9577 
Roa -0.6724 0.0232 <0.01 -0.03 0.07 <0.01 5961 9577 
Invrec 0.2581 0.2227 <0.01 0.2 0.2 0.02 5961 9577 
Special 0.52 0.7089 <0.01 1 1 <0.01 5961 9577 
Restruc 0.1419 0.3488 <0.01 0 0 <0.01 5961 9577 
Lev 1.4319 0.5206 <0.01 0.56 0.49 <0.01 5961 9577 
Busy 0.7121 0.7527 <0.01 1 1 <0.01 5961 9577 
Loss 0.6081 0.313 <0.01 1 0 <0.01 5961 9577 
Forop 0.1777 0.3271 <0.01 0 0 <0.01 5961 9577 
Frsk 0.6762 0.7573 <0.01 1 1 <0.01 5961 9577 
Filing 87.3374 63.6754 <0.01 89 60 <0.01 5961 9577 
Merger 0.0574 0.136 <0.01 0 0 <0.01 5961 9577 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the variable used in the audit fees analyses during the sample period of 2002-2010. 
See Panel A of Table 1 for variable definition. I winsorize the top and bottom of one percent of each of the continuous 
variables to mitigate the influence of outliers. Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the variable used in the audit fees 
analyses during the sample period of 2007-2010.  
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Table 3 
 Correlation matrix. 
Variable Lnauditfees (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1)    Sox404b 
0.5776 
                          
[0.000] 
(2)    Big4 
0.5964 0.3216 
            [0.000] [0.000] 
(3)    Size 
0.8679 0.4761 0.62026 
           [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
(4)    Roa 
0.3603 0.1864 0.27132 0.51902 
          [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
(5)    Invrec 
-0.04 -0.0844 -0.1057 -0.0835 0.11321 
         [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
(6)    Special 
0.3111 0.1475 0.16968 0.23408 0.05143 -0.0243 
        [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
(7)    Restruc 
0.3592 0.1571 0.23078 0.2768 0.09971 0.02209 0.45547 
       [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
(8)    Lev 
-0.2572 -0.1508 -0.2123 -0.3923 -0.765 -0.0368 -0.0168 -0.065 
      [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
(9)    Busy 
0.103 0.0836 0.08676 0.09776 -0.0044 -0.1375 0.01767 -0.0028 0.0097 
     [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.3888] [0.000] [0.000] [0.5862] [0.0566] 
(10)   Loss 
-0.3172 0.2374 -0.2457 -0.4368 -0.3028 -0.1198 0.0626 0.04819 0.18731 0.01678 
    [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
(11)  Forop 
0.2604 0.1657 0.11683 0.1674 0.0782 0.0737 0.147 0.2081 -0.0563 -0.0193 -0.0594 
   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
(12)  Frsk 
0.0481 0.0682 0.1055 0.062 0.149 0.1374 0.0449 0.0424 -0.1279 -0.0179 0.13411 0.0493 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
(13)  Filing 
-0.4072 -0.4088 -0.3373 -0.4781 -0.2741 0.06426 -0.0445 -0.1112 0.2498 -0.067 0.2945 0.0855 0.0428 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
(14)  Merg 
0.1684 0.1265 0.0715 0.1383 0.0479 -0.0279 0.2095 0.1147 -0.0348 0.0089 -0.0387 0.0785 0.0243 0.0888 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.0819] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
This table presents Pearson correlations for the variables used in the audit fees analyses. See Panel B of Table 1 for variable definition. Numbers 
in brackets are two-tailed p-values. 
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Table 4 
Correlation matrix for audit fee: 2002-2006 
 
Lnauditfees 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
(1) 
Sox404b 0.5300* 
             (2) Big4 0.5800* 0.2400* 
            (3) Size 0.8591* 0.3837* 0.6217* 
           (4) Roa 0.3632* 0.1465* 0.2940* 0.5235* 
          (5) Invrec -0.0414* -0.065* -0.105* -0.085* 0.1070* 
         (6) Special 0.2988* 0.1130* 0.1557* 0.2256* 0.0427* -0.0365* 
        (7) Restruc 0.3391* 0.1013* 0.2135* 0.2676* 0.0984* 0.0094 0.4524* 
       (8) Lev -0.2569* -0.120* -0.235* -0.392* -0.7594* -0.0256* -0.0152* -0.0656* 
      (9) Busy 0.1159* 0.1000* 0.0840* 0.1029* -0.0028 -0.1333* 0.0211* 0.0047 0.0143* 
     (10) Loss -0.3195* -0.218* -0.249* -0.439* -0.3042* -0.1365* 0.0690* 0.0678* 0.1868* 0.0136* 
    (11) Forop 0.2496* 0.1299* 0.1219* 0.1648* 0.0778* 0.0701* 0.1331* 0.1897* -0.0501* -0.0127 -0.0661* 
   (12) Frsk 0.0794* 0.0659* 0.1505* 0.1036* 0.1637* 0.1354* 0.0451* 0.0539* -0.1339* -0.0174* -0.1554* 0.0498* 
  (13) Filing -0.3117* -0.275* -0.302* -0.403* -0.2544* 0.0539* -0.0088 -0.0636* 0.2396* -0.0616* 0.2797* -0.043* -0.0534* 
 (14) Merg 0.1164* 0.0624* 0.0486* 0.0905* 0.0270* -0.0192* 0.1640* 0.0791* -0.0179* -0.002 -0.0168* 0.0399* 0.0153* -0.0340* 
 
*indicates significance at 0.05 level. 
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Table 5 
Correlation matrix for audit fee: 2007-2010 
 
Lnauditfees 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
(1) 
Sox404b 0.6152* 
             (2) Big4 0.6799* 0.5330* 
            (3) Size 0.8827* 0.6018* 0.6492* 
           (4) Roa 0.3631* 0.2597* 0.2442* 0.5152* 
          (5) Invrec -0.0207* -0.089* -0.118* -0.072* 0.1247* 
         (6) Special 0.3281* 0.1909* 0.1982* 0.2427* 0.0645* -0.0016 
        (7) Restruc 0.3882* 0.2267* 0.2632* 0.2861* 0.1012* 0.0450* 0.4590* 
       (8) Lev -0.2657* -0.210* -0.184* -0.396* -0.774* -0.054* -0.019* -0.064* 
      (9) Busy 0.0728* 0.0449* 0.0991* 0.0838* -0.0078 -0.141* 0.0098 -0.016* 0.0029 
     (10) Loss -0.3228* -0.290* -0.245* -0.438* -0.301* -0.095* 0.0533* 0.0205* 0.1880* 0.0218* 
    (11) Forop 0.2525* 0.1638* 0.1321* 0.1558* 0.0781* 0.0903* 0.1610* 0.2270* -0.065* -0.036* -0.051* 
   (12) Frsk 0.007 0.0885* 0.0423* 0.0041 0.1273* 0.1396* 0.0457* 0.0273* -0.119* -0.018* -0.103* 0.0523* 
  (13) Filing -0.5176* -0.522* -0.466* -0.587* -0.319* 0.0599* -0.088* -0.175* 0.2820* -0.062* 0.3359* -0.103* -0.036* 
 (14) Merg 0.1954* 0.1242* 0.1184* 0.1714* 0.0694* -0.027* 0.2600* 0.1453* -0.053* 0.0115 -0.061* 0.0912* 0.0376* -0.098* 
 
*indicates significance at 0.05 level. 
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Table 6 
 Panel regressions for audit fees analyses during the sample year of 2002 – 2006. 
 (1Within) (2Within) (3Between) (4Between) 
 ln_auditfees ln_auditfees ln_auditfees ln_auditfees 
Sox404b 0.536*** 0.491*** 3.078*** 0.562*** 
 (42.61) (42.37) (55.32) (16.67) 
Big4  0.284***  0.399*** 
  (14.40)  (17.01) 
Size  0.313***  0.432*** 
  (23.35)  (82.90) 
Roa  -0.0506***  -0.0762*** 
  (-6.08)  (-8.26) 
Invrec  0.224***  0.512*** 
  (3.89)  (13.04) 
Special  0.0450***  0.265*** 
  (5.94)  (10.90) 
Restruc  0.0112  0.326*** 
  (1.16)  (12.19) 
Lev  0.00420  0.0150** 
  (0.76)  (2.81) 
Busy  0.0969  0.0795*** 
  (1.23)  (4.88) 
Loss  0.0715***  0.212*** 
  (7.75)  (9.46) 
Forop  0.0358*  0.267*** 
  (2.07)  (12.50) 
Frsk  0.0334*  -0.0717*** 
  (2.46)  (-3.68) 
Filing  0.00338***  0.00328*** 
  (14.61)  (7.43) 
Merger  0.0978***  0.0919 
  (5.85)  (1.64) 
Year effect Y Y Y Y 
Cons 12.45*** 10.17*** 12.15*** 9.112*** 
 (2001.42) (112.43) (197.02) (144.69) 
N 22958 22958 22958 22958 
This table presents coefficients from panel regressions of ln(audit fees) on Sox404b and 
other control variables as in Panel A of Table 1 during the sample year of 2002-2006. 
Sox404b is set equal to 1 if the firm is required to comply with Section 404(b), 0 otherwise. 
All regression use year dummies and unbalanced panels. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels. t statistics are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 7 
Panel regressions for audit fees analyses during the sample year of 2007 – 2010. 
  (1Within) (2Between) 
 
ln_auditfees ln_auditfees 
Sox404b 
0.0780*** 0.264*** 
(4.93) (10.65) 
Big4 
0.378*** 0.432*** 
(8.95) (18.75) 
Size 
0.266*** 0.430*** 
(18.82) (74.26) 
Roa 
-0.0414*** -0.0845*** 
(-4.44) (-7.84) 
Invrec 
0.144** 0.528*** 
(2.58) (12) 
Special 
0.0215** 0.257*** 
(3.08) (9.69) 
Restruc 
0.0171* 0.299*** 
(1.96) (11.15) 
Lev 
0.00734 0.0227*** 
(1.31) (3.77) 
Busy 
-0.0953 0.00936 
(-0.96) (0.52) 
Loss 
0.0402*** 0.216*** 
(5.27) (8.97) 
Forop 
0.0313 0.255*** 
(1.86) (12.86) 
Frsk 
0.0399** 0.00138 
(2.91) (0.07) 
Filing 
0.00190*** 0.000936 
(5.41) (1.76) 
Merger 
0.0537*** 0.148*** 
(5.41) (3.84) 
Year effect Y                                    Y 
Cons 
11.52*** 10.12*** 
(95.61) (142.61) 
N 15538 15538 
  This table presents coefficients from panel regressions of ln(audit fees) on Sox404b and 
  other control variables as in Panel A of Table 1 during the sample year of 2007-2010. 
  Sox404b is set equal to 1 if the firm is required to comply with Section 404(b), 0 
  otherwise. All regression use year dummies and unbalanced panels. *, **, and *** 
  indicate significance at 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels. t statistics are reported in parentheses.
 
 
Table 8 
Descriptive statistics. 
Panel A: 2002 - 2010               
Variable 
Mean p-value for 
Difference 
Median p-value for 
Difference 
n 
Sox404b=0 Sox404b=1 Sox404b=0 Sox404b=1 Sox404b=0 Sox404b=1 
Rating 10.9 10.69 0.01 11 11 0.007 2178 5856 
Intcov 0.92 0.84 0.01 0.51 0.47 0.25 2178 5856 
Liquidity 1832.64 2711.72 <0.01 621.61 1046.79 <0.01 2178 5856 
Ln_sale 7.52 8.03 <0.01 7.46 7.96 <0.01 2178 5856 
Ln_age 2.9 3.13 <0.01 2.94 3.18 <0.01 2178 5856 
Ln_at 7.77 8.27 <0.01 7.63 8.15 <0.01 2178 5856 
Lev 0.63 0.61 <0.01 0.64 0.61 <0.01 2178 5856 
Big4 0.97 0.97 0.7 1 1 0.7 2178 5856 
         Panel B: 2007 - 2010 
       
Variable 
Mean p-value for 
Difference 
Median p-value for 
Difference 
n 
Sox404b=0 Sox404b=1 Sox404b=0 Sox404b=1 Sox404b=0 Sox404b=1 
Rating 14.1287 10.742 <0.01 15 11 <0.01 101 3318 
Intcov 0.7303 0.8386 0.3714 0.23 0.45 0.0076 101 3318 
Liquidity 681.6166 2952.8789 <0.01 248.65 1166.1 <0.01 101 3318 
Ln_sale 6.69 8.131 <0.01 6.55 8.08 <0.01 101 3318 
Ln_age 2.2746 3.1666 <0.01 2.2 3.18 <0.01 101 3318 
Ln_at 7.0565 8.3902 <0.01 6.6 8.28 <0.01 101 3318 
Lev 0.7151 0.6162 <0.01 0.75 0.62 <0.01 101 3318 
Big4 0.7426 0.9629 <0.01 1 1 <0.01 101 3318 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the variable used in the credit rating analyses during the sample period of 2002-2010. See Panel B of 
Table 1 for variable definition. I winsorize the top and bottom of one percent of each of the continuous variables to mitigate the influence of 
outliers. Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the variable used in the credit rating analyses during the sample period of 2007-2010.  
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Table 9 
Correlation matrix during 2002-2010. 
Variable rating (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1)Sox404b 
-0.02869        
[0.01]        
         
(2)Big4 
0.15595 0.00435       
[0.000] [0.6964]       
         
(3)Ln_age 
-0.47394 .13036 .10202      
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]      
         
(4)Size 
0.59785 .16683 .18126 .39055     
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]     
         
(5)Ln_sale 
0.59058 .16046 .19702 .40281 .86525    
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]    
         
(6)Intcov 
0.00115 .02369 .00238 .02023 .01820 .01161   
[0.9179] [0.0337] [0.8313] [0.0698] [0.1029] [0.2981]   
         
(7)Liquidity 
0.44783 .07707 .07370 .25012 .62366 .61413 .01161  
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.2981]  
         
(8)Lev 
.23587 0.06670 0.02439 .00591 0.02313 .01208 0.01047 0.06299 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.0288] [0.5963] [0.0381] [0.2790] [0.3479] [0.000] 
This table presents Pearson correlations for the variables used in the credit rating analyses. See Panel B of Table 1 for variable definition. Numbers 
in brackets are two-tailed p-values. 
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Table 10 
Correlation matrix for credit rating: 2007-2010 
 
rating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(1) Sox404b -0.1771* 
       (2) Big4 -0.1861* 0.1827* 
      (3) Ln_age -0.4650* 0.1957* 0.1341* 
     (4) Size -0.6024* 0.1718* 0.2241* 0.3696* 
    (5) Ln_sale -0.5930* 0.1761* 0.2448* 0.3955* 0.8685* 
   (6) Intcov 0.1383* 0.0153 0.0267 0.0724* -0.0958* 0.1238* 
  (7) Liquidity -0.5312* 0.0803* 0.1121* 0.2808* 0.7018* 0.7064* 0.0396* 
 (8) Lev 0.2697* -0.1052* -0.0391* -0.0425* -0.0405* -0.0038 0.0175 -0.0680* 
 
*indicates significance at 0.05 level. 
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Table 11 
Panel regressions for credit rating analyses during the sample year of 2002 - 2010. 
 (1Within) (2Within) (3Between) (4Between) 
 rating rating rating rating 
Sox404b -0.407*** -0.261** -3.815*** 0.465 
 (-6.11) (-3.29) (-7.52) (1.31) 
     
Intcov  0.127***  0.517*** 
  (5.35)  (9.11) 
 
Liquidity  -0.0000155  -0.0000669** 
  (-0.86)  (-3.23) 
     
Ln_sale  -0.560***  -0.989*** 
  (-4.28)  (-10.76) 
     
Ln_age  -0.473*  -1.080*** 
  (-2.06)  (-14.70) 
     
Size  -0.168  -0.149 
  (-1.40)  (-1.51) 
     
Lev  3.740***  4.439*** 
  (11.54)  (12.91) 
     
Big4  -0.293  -0.340 
  (-1.77)  (-1.25) 
 
Year effect Y Y Y Y 
 
Cons 11.17*** 15.16*** 13.06*** 20.52*** 
 (129.17) (15.37) (33.88) (37.27) 
N 8034 8034 8034 8034 
This table presents coefficients from panel regressions of rating on Sox404b and other control 
variables as in Panel B of Table 1 during the sample year of 2002-2010. Sox404b is set equal to 
1 if the firm is required to comply with Section 404(b), 0 otherwise. All regression use year 
dummies and unbalanced panels. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 
levels. t statistics are reported in parentheses. 
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 Table 12 
  Panel regressions for credit rating analyses during the sample year of 2007 – 2010. 
 (1Within) (2Between) 
 rating rating 
Sox404b -0.429*** -0.137 
 (-3.64) (-0.34) 
   
Intcov 0.0682* 0.664*** 
 (2.08) (9.50) 
   
Liquidity -0.00000940 -0.000124*** 
 (-0.54) (-5.90) 
   
Ln_sale -0.523*** -0.927*** 
 (-4.58) (-7.92) 
   
Ln_age 0.120 -1.011*** 
 (0.36) (-10.83) 
   
Size -0.412** 0.0160 
 (-2.84) (0.13) 
   
Lev 2.743*** 5.037*** 
 (7.76) (11.97) 
   
Big4 -0.341 -0.333 
 (-1.27) (-1.08) 
   
Year effect Yes Yes 
 
Cons 17.04*** 19.36*** 
 (10.62) (26.62) 
N 3419 3419 
This table presents coefficients from panel regressions of rating on Sox404b and other control 
variables as in Panel B of Table 1 during the sample year of 2007-2010. Sox404b is set equal to 
1 if the firm is required to comply with Section 404(b), 0 otherwise. All regression use year 
dummies and unbalanced panels. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 
levels. t statistics are reported in parentheses. 
  
Table 13 
Descriptive statistics. 
2002 - 2010 
variable 
Mean p-value for 
Difference 
Median p-value for 
Difference 
n 
Sox404b=0 Sox404b=1 Sox404b=0 Sox404b=1 Sox404b=0 Sox404b=1 
Ln_tobin_q 0.4417 0.5523 <0.01 0.33 0.46 <0.01 14483 16247 
Salegrowth 1.1217 0.2334 <0.01 0.27 0.1 <0.01 14483 16247 
Size 4.7258 6.6346 <0.01 4.44 6.51 <0.01 14483 16247 
Lev 0.458 0.4666 <0.01 0.45 0.47 <0.01 14483 16247 
Ppe 1.0294 1.0162 0.61 0.38 0.39 <0.01 14483 16247 
Capital 1.1472 0.2158 <0.01 0.24 0.03 <0.01 14483 16247 
Ebit -0.794 -0.4027 <0.01 0.06 0.12 <0.01 14483 16247 
Merger 0.0436 0.1069 <0.01 0 0 <0.01 14483 16247 
Ln_age 2.4843 2.7615 <0.01 2.48 2.71 <0.01 14483 16247 
2007 - 2010 
variable 
Mean p-value for 
Difference 
Median p-value for 
Difference 
n 
Sox404b=0 Sox404b=1 Sox404b=0 Sox404b=1 Sox404b=0 Sox404b=1 
Ln_tobin_q 0.3541 0.4662 <0.01 0.2 0.37 <0.01 3892 9197 
Salegrowth 0.7404 0.1995 <0.01 0.11 0.07 <0.01 3892 9197 
Size 3.7417 6.7376 <0.01 3.69 6.63 <0.01 3892 9197 
Lev 0.445 0.4757 <0.01 0.42 0.48 <0.01 3892 9197 
Ppe 1.1466 1.0581 <0.01 0.33 0.4 <0.01 3892 9197 
Capital 2.1115 0.2026 <0.01 0.62 0.02 <0.01 3892 9197 
Ebit -1.2889 -0.3361 <0.01 0.03 0.12 <0.01 3892 9197 
Merger 0.0658 0.142 <0.01 0 0 <0.01 3892 9197 
Ln_age 2.4542 2.8098 <0.01 2.56 2.77 <0.01 3892 9197 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the variable used in the Tobin’s q analyses during the sample period of 2002-2010. See Panel C of Table 
1 for variable definition. I winsorize the top and bottom of one percent of each of the continuous variables to mitigate the influence of outliers. 
Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the variable used in the credit rating analyses during the sample period of 2007-2010.  
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Table 14 
Panel regressions for Tobin’s q analyses during the sample year of 2002 – 2010. 
 (1Within) (2Within) (3Between) (4Between) 
 ln_tobin_q ln_tobin_q ln_tobin_q ln_tobin_q 
Sox404b -0.00660 0.0817*** 0.144*** 0.668*** 
 (-0.88) (8.34) (6.34) (23.72) 
     
Salegrowth  0.0733***  0.173*** 
  (16.22)  (13.80) 
     
Size  -0.155***  -0.0708*** 
  (-15.39)  (-14.25) 
     
Lev  0.0376  -0.0987** 
  (1.30)  (-3.10) 
     
Ppe  -0.0212***  -0.0333*** 
  (-4.55)  (-9.17) 
     
Capital  0.0124  0.0211*** 
  (1.84)  (7.04) 
     
Ebit  -0.0112***  -0.0311*** 
  (-4.18)  (-14.40) 
     
Merger  -0.0224**  -0.0544 
  (-2.62)  (-1.37) 
     
Ln_age  -0.0572*  -0.0169 
  (-2.20)  (-1.83) 
 
Year effect Y Y Y Y 
 
Cons 0.353*** 1.109*** 0.0620* 0.0248 
 (60.62) (13.38) (2.18) (0.48) 
 
N 30730 30730 30730 30730 
 This table presents coefficients from panel regressions of ln(Tobin’s q) on Sox404b and other 
control variables as in Panel C of Table 1 during the sample year of 2002-2010. Sox404b is set 
equal to 1 if the firm is required to comply with Section 404(b), 0 otherwise. All regression use 
year dummies and unbalanced panels. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 0.05, 0.01, and 
0.001 levels. t statistics are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 15 
Panel regressions for Tobin’s q analyses during the sample year of 2007 – 2010. 
 (1Within) (2Between) 
 ln_tobin_q ln_tobin_q 
Sox404b 0.0827*** 0.591*** 
 (4.48) (23.03) 
   
Salegrowth 0.0555*** 0.186*** 
 (8.44) (15.32) 
   
Size -0.266*** -0.0808*** 
 (-13.52) (-13.81) 
   
Lev 0.200*** 0.0238 
 (4.18) (0.63) 
   
Ppe -0.0172** -0.0314*** 
 (-2.78) (-7.80) 
   
Capital 0.0137 0.0245*** 
 (1.67) (7.11) 
   
Ebit -0.00501 -0.0267*** 
 (-1.32) (-11.03) 
   
Merger -0.0297** -0.0650 
 (-2.93) (-1.87) 
   
Ln_age -0.0727 -0.0139 
 (-1.40) (-1.27) 
   
Year effect Y Y 
 
Cons 2.176*** 0.448*** 
 (12.50) (9.97) 
 
N 13089 13089 
This table presents coefficients from panel regressions of ln(Tobin’s q) on Sox404b and other 
control variables as in Panel C of Table 1 during the sample year of 2007-2010. Sox404b is set 
equal to 1 if the firm is required to comply with Section 404(b), 0 otherwise. All regression use 
year dummies and unbalanced panels. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 0.05, 0.01, and 
0.001 levels. t statistics are reported in parentheses. 
  
Figure 3 
Audit Fee - Research Design and Analyses 
Before 
analysis 
 
Change Both SOX 404a and SOX 404b 
Status 
Analysis Hypothesis 
Across 
time 
Non-accelerated filer switch to 
accelerated filer 
Analyze change on audit fee Audit fees increase 
Accelerated filer switch to non-
accelerated filer 
Analyze change on audit fee Audit fees decrease 
Cross 
section 
Accelerated filer vs. non-accelerated filer Analyze difference in means 
Accelerated filer audit fees greater 
than non-accelerated filer audit fee 
Accelerated filer vs. non-accelerated filer Analyze difference in means 
Accelerated filer audit fees greater 
than non-accelerated filer audit fee 
After 
analysis 
Across 
time 
Non-accelerated filer switch to 
accelerated filer 
Analyze change on audit fee Audit fees increase 
Accelerated filer switch to non-
accelerated filer 
Analyze change on audit fee Audit fees decrease 
Cross 
section 
Accelerated filer vs. non-accelerated filer Analyze difference in means 
Accelerated filer audit fees greater 
than non-accelerated filer audit fees 
Accelerated filer vs. non-accelerated filer Analyze difference in means 
Accelerated filer audit fees greater 
than non-accelerated filer audit fees 
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Figure 4 
Audit Fee - Research Design, Tables of Results, and Result Summary 
Pre 
2007 
 
Change Both 
SOX 404a and 
SOX 404b Status 
Analysis Hypothesis Results Table Inference 
Across 
time 
Non-accelerated 
filer switch to 
accelerated filer 
Analyze change on 
audit fees 
Audit fees increase 
Table 6 
"Within" 
analyses 
Audit fees increase 
dramatically 
Accelerated filer 
switch to non-
accelerated filer 
Analyze change on 
audit fees 
Audit fees decrease 
Audit fees decrease 
dramatically 
Cross 
section 
Accelerated filer 
vs. non-
accelerated filer 
Analyze difference 
in means 
Accelerated audit fees 
greater than non-
accelerated filer audit fee 
Table 6 
"Between" 
analyses 
Accelerated filer audit 
fees greater than non-
accelerated filer 
Accelerated filer 
vs. non-
accelerated filer 
Analyze difference 
in means 
Accelerated audit fee 
greater than non-
accelerated filer audit fee 
Accelerated filer audit 
fees greater than non-
accelerated filer 
Post 
2007 
Across 
time 
Non-accelerated 
filer switch to 
accelerated filer 
Analyze change on 
audit fees 
Audit fees increase 
Table 7 
"Within" 
analyses 
Audit fees increase 
Accelerated filer 
switch to non-
accelerated filer 
Analyze change on 
audit fees 
Audit fees decrease Audit fees decrease 
Cross 
section 
Accelerated filer 
vs. non-
accelerated filer 
Analyze difference 
in means 
Accelerated audit fees 
greater than non-
accelerated filer audit fees 
Table 7 
"Between" 
analyses 
Accelerated filer audit 
fees are greater than 
non-accelerated filer 
Accelerated filer 
vs. non-
accelerated filer 
Analyze difference 
in means 
Accelerated audit fees 
greater than non-
accelerated filer audit fees 
Accelerated filer audit 
fees are greater than 
non-accelerated filer 
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Figure 5 
Credit Rating - Research Design and Analysis. 
  
Change Both SOX 404a and SOX 
404b Status 
Analysis Hypothesis 
Full period 
Across time 
Non-accelerated filer switch to 
accelerated filer 
Analyze change in 
credit rating 
Credit rating improves 
Accelerated filer switch to non-
accelerated filer 
Analyze change in 
credit rating 
Credit rating deteriorates 
Cross section 
Accelerated filer vs. non-
accelerated filer 
Analyze difference in 
means 
Accelerated filer has better credit rating than 
non-accelerated filer 
Accelerated filer vs. non-
accelerated filer 
Analyze difference in 
means 
Accelerated filer has better credit rating than 
non-accelerated filer 
Post 2007 
Across time 
Non-accelerated filer switch to 
accelerated filer 
Analyze change on 
audit fees 
Credit rating improves 
Accelerated filer switch to non-
accelerated filer 
Analyze change on 
audit fees 
Credit rating deteriorates 
Cross section 
Accelerated filer vs. non-
accelerated filer 
Analyze difference in 
means 
Accelerated filer has better credit rating than 
non-accelerated filer 
Accelerated filer vs. non-
accelerated filer 
Analyze difference in 
means 
Accelerated filer has better credit rating than 
non-accelerated filer 
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Figure 6 
Credit Rating - Research Design, Tables of Results, and Result Summary 
  
Change Both SOX 
404a and SOX 404b 
Status 
Analysis Hypothesis Result Table Inference 
Full 
period 
Across 
time 
Non-accelerated filer 
switch to accelerated 
filer 
Analyze 
change in 
credit rating 
Credit rating improves 
Table 11 
"Within" 
analysis 
Credit rating improves 
Accelerated filer 
switch to non-
accelerated filer 
Analyze 
change in 
credit rating 
Credit rating deteriorates Credit rating deteriorates 
Cross 
section 
Accelerated filer vs. 
non-accelerated filer 
Analyze 
difference in 
means 
Accelerated filer has better 
credit rating than non-
accelerated filer 
Table11 
"Between" 
analysis 
No significant difference in 
credit rating between the 
two groups 
Accelerated filer vs. 
non-accelerated filer 
Analyze 
difference in 
means 
Accelerated filer has better 
credit rating than non-
accelerated filer 
No significant difference in 
credit rating between the 
two groups 
Post 
2007 
Across 
time 
Non-accelerated filer 
switch to accelerated 
filer 
Analyze 
change on 
audit fees 
Credit rating improves 
Table 12 
"Within" 
analysis 
Credit rating improves 
Accelerated filer 
switch to non-
accelerated filer 
Analyze 
change on 
audit fees 
Credit rating deteriorates Credit rating deteriorates 
Cross 
section 
Accelerated filer vs. 
non-accelerated filer 
Analyze 
difference in 
means 
Accelerated filer has better 
credit rating than non-
accelerated filer 
Table 12 
"Between" 
analysis 
Accelerated filer has better 
credit rating than non-
accelerated filer 
Accelerated filer vs. 
non-accelerated filer 
Analyze 
difference in 
means 
Accelerated filer has better 
credit rating than non-
accelerated filer 
Accelerated filer has better 
credit rating than non-
accelerated filer 
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Figure 7 
Tobin's q - Research Design and Analyses 
  
Change Both SOX 404a and SOX 404b 
Status 
Analysis Hypothesis 
Full period 
Across time 
Non-accelerated filer switches to 
accelerated filer 
Analyze change in 
Tobin's q 
Tobin's q increases 
Accelerated filer switches to non-
accelerated filer 
Analyze change in 
Tobin's q 
Tobin's q decreases 
Cross section 
Accelerated filer vs. non-accelerated 
filer 
Analyze difference 
in means 
Accelerated filer has higher Tobin's q than 
non-accelerated filer 
Accelerated filer vs. non-accelerated 
filer 
Analyze difference 
in means 
Accelerated filer has higher Tobin's q than 
non-accelerated filer 
Post 2007 
Across time 
Non-accelerated filer switches to 
accelerated filer 
Analyze change in 
Tobin's q 
Tobin's q increases 
Accelerated filer switches to non-
accelerated filer 
Analyze change in 
Tobin's q 
Tobin's q decreases 
Cross section 
Accelerated filer vs. non-accelerated 
filer 
Analyze difference 
in means 
Accelerated filer has higher Tobin's q than 
non-accelerated filer 
Accelerated filer vs. non-accelerated 
filer 
Analyze difference 
in means 
Accelerated filer has higher Tobin's q than 
non-accelerated filer 
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Figure 8 
Tobin's q - Research Design, Tables of Results, and Result Summary 
  
Change Both SOX 404a 
and SOX 404b Status 
Analysis Hypothesis Result Table Inference 
Full 
period 
Across 
time 
Non-accelerated filer 
switch to accelerated filer 
Analyze 
change in 
Tobin's q 
Tobin's q increases 
Table 
14 
"Within" 
analysis 
Tobin's q increases 
Accelerated filer switch to 
non-accelerated filer 
Analyze 
change in 
Tobin's q 
Tobin's q decreases Tobin's q decreases 
Cross 
section 
Accelerated filer vs. non-
accelerated filer 
Analyze 
difference in 
means 
Accelerated filer has higher 
Tobin's q than non-
accelerated filer Table 
14 
"Between" 
analysis 
Accelerated filer has 
higher Tobin's q than 
non-accelerated filer 
Accelerated filer vs. non-
accelerated filer 
Analyze 
difference in 
means 
Accelerated filer has higher 
Tobin's q than non-
accelerated filer 
Accelerated filer has 
higher Tobin's q than 
non-accelerated filer 
Post 
2007 
Across 
time 
Non-accelerated filer 
switch to accelerated filer 
Analyze 
change in 
Tobin's q 
Tobin's q increases 
Table 
15 
"Within" 
analysis 
Tobin's q increases 
Accelerated filer switch to 
non-accelerated filer 
Analyze 
change in 
Tobin's q 
Tobin's q decreases Tobin's q decreases 
Cross 
section 
Accelerated filer vs. non-
accelerated filer 
Analyze 
difference in 
means 
Accelerated filer has higher 
Tobin's q than non-
accelerated filer Table 
15 
"Between" 
analysis 
Accelerated filer has 
higher Tobin's q than 
non-accelerated filer 
Accelerated filer vs. non-
accelerated filer 
Analyze 
difference in 
means 
Accelerated filer has higher 
Tobin's q than non-
accelerated filer 
Accelerated filer has 
higher Tobin's q than 
non-accelerated filer 
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Figure 9  
Summary of Hypothesis and Inference  
 
Hypothesis Inference Summary 
Audit Fees 
Audit fees increase(decrease) for companies that switch from 
required noncompliance (compliance) to compliance 
(noncompliance) with SOX 404(b) 
Compliance cost increases (decreases) for companies that switch 
from required noncompliance (compliance) to compliance 
(noncompliance) with SOX 404(b) 
Credit Rating 
Credit rating improves (deteriorates) for companies that switch 
from required noncompliance (compliance) to compliance 
(noncompliance) with SOX 404(b) 
Cost of debt decreases (increases) for companies that switch from 
required noncompliance (compliance) to compliance 
(noncompliance) with SOX 404(b) 
Tobin's q 
Tobin's q increase (decrease) for companies that switch from 
required noncompliance (compliance) to compliance 
(noncompliance) with SOX 404(b) 
Firm net compliance benefit increase (decrease) for companies that 
switch from required noncompliance (compliance) to compliance 
(noncompliance) with SOX 404(b) 
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Chapter 7 
Example and further analysis 
7.1 An example 
My results indicate that SOX 404(b) increases firms’ audit fees, upgrades firms’ credit 
rating, and improves overall firm value premium. It would be appealing to find out how SOX 
404(b) affects a firm monetarily.  
One example is Allis-Chalmers. Allis-Chalmers’s 10-K annual report for fiscal year 2005 
declares the company as a non-accelerated filer, and its auditor, UHY Mann Frankfort Stein & 
Lipp CPAs, does not assess the company’s internal control over financial reporting that year. In 
fiscal year 2006, Allis-Chalmers’s aggregate market value of the common equity held by its non-
affiliates is $139,745,249, which is above the threshold of $75 million. In the 2006 10-K, Allis-
Chalmers files as an accelerated filer. The same auditor, UHY, assesses and presents its opinion 
that Allis-Chalmers maintains an effective internal control over financial reporting in the 10-K 
annual report. The total audit fees incurred in 2005 was $632,612 while in 2006, the total was 
$850,223-an increase of $217,611, which in terms of  a percentage is 34.40%. We assume the 
increase in audit fees represents the cost of having an auditor assess Allis-Chalmers’ internal 
control system in order to achieve SOX 404(b) compliance.  Then, let us turn to find the 
monetary benefit that having an auditors’ assessment brings to Allis-Chalmers.  The Loan Pricing 
Company (LPC) Dealscan database comprises a variety of historical bank loan data. Searching 
Dealscan from 2002 to 2009, I find ten instances of borrowing by Allis-Chalmers. The active 
dates for the ten deals are: one on 2/1/2002, three dated on 12/7/2004 and another three on 
7/11/2005, one on 1/18/2006, one on 4/26/2007 and one on 12/3/2007.  Because Allis-Chalmers’ 
fiscal year ending date is December 31, the deal with an active date of 1/18/2006 should be the 
last deal closed before the first assessment of Allis-Chalmers’s internal control was completed. 
The deal with an active date of 4/26/2007 was made after Allis-Chalmers’s auditor audited its 
internal control system for fiscal year 2006. The interest rate in Dealscan calls drawn all-in 
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spread over LIBOR (i.e., AIS). The AIS in the pre-assessment deal is 300.00 basis points, and it is 
175.00 basis points for the after-assessment deal. The interest rate has dropped by 125.00 basis 
points. We can estimate the monetary interest saving for Allis-Chalmers as follow: The average 
amount of Allis-Chalmers loan facility is $25,733,500, and the mean maturity of the loan is 38.3 
months, or 3.18 years. That shows that after having its auditor assesses the internal control system, 
Allis-Chalmers has saved estimated annual interest expenses of $321,668.75. Compared to the 
increased audit fee cost of $217,611, the net annual savings for Allis-Chalmers is $104,057.75. 
The Allis-Chalmers’s example provides evidence that the benefit of the auditors’ assessment of 
internal control system outweighs the cost. 
7.2 Further Analysis 
7.2.1 Move up and Move down sample  
In the within regression analysis, only the firms which experience variation in SOX 404(b) 
compliance status were identified. The variation could be either firms switching from the non-
accelerated filer to accelerated filer, or the reverse. In addition, some firms experienced both 
changes. In order to address the concern that the results are only driven by one of the two changes, 
dividing the sample into two subsamples—the move up sample and the move down sample—I 
conduct the same analysis under each subsample. The move up sample includes firms which at 
some point in the data cross the threshold with moves them from non-compliance to compliance. 
While the move down sample consists of firms that have changed from having an auditors’ 
assessment of the internal control system to no longer receiving that assessment in at least one 
firm-year.  
Untabulated analyses of panel regressions for the audit fees show the coefficient for 
sox404b is positive (0.38) for the move-up group, and it is 0.30 for the move-down group.12 Both 
of the coefficients are significant at 0.001 levels. The results are consistent with the result from 
                                                            
12 All panel regressions in this entire study use year dummies and robust standard errors. 
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the entire sample.13 For other control variables, all the coefficients between the two subsamples 
are highly consistent. They are also consistent with the whole sample as well. This analysis 
provides evidence that the results are not driven by only one of the subsamples. 
I conduct the same analyses for credit rating for the two subsamples—move-up firms and 
move-down firms. The results are consistent between the two subsamples. The coefficient of 
sox404b is negative (-0.13), and it is significant (p<0.05) for the move-up sample. The coefficient 
of sox404b is -0.7, and it is highly significant (p<0.001) for the move-down sample. The results 
are consistent with the result from the entire sample. From Table 9, we know the coefficient of 
sox404b for the full sample is -0.26, and it is highly significant (p<0.001). For other control 
variables, the coefficients are very similar between the two subsamples. The coefficients are also 
consistent with the results from the entire sample. 
Last, I conduct the same fixed effects regressions for Tobin’s q for the two subsamples. 
For the move-up sample, the coefficient of sox404b is positive (0.12), and it is significant at 0.001 
level. The coefficient of sox404b is 0.23 for the sample of the move down, and it is significant at 
0.001 level. The results of all the rest of the control variables are consistent between the two 
groups. For most of the variables, they are also consistent with the results from the entire sample. 
One exception is the coefficient for the merger variable. It is not significant for the two 
subsamples, and it is significantly negative at 0.01 level from the full sample. 
In summary, all the three results still hold after I separate the sample into the move-up 
sample and the move-down sample. The results in this section are consistent with the primary 
results, which indicate the results are not driven by one of the subsamples. 
7.2.2 Merge & Acquisition   
About 6.7% of the sample has a merger and acquisition during the sample period of 2002 
to 2010. A concern is whether those firms which experience a merger and acquisition are 
                                                            
13 Untabulated analyses show for the entire sample, the coefficient of sox404b is positive (0.34), 
and it is highly significant (p<0.01). 
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systematically different from those without a merger&acqusition, and thus drive the results.  I 
separate the whole sample into two subsamples—merger sample and non-merger sample—and 
then rerun the analyses. Merger sample (merger = 1) includes the firms that have a merger and 
acquisition activity and non-merger (merger = 0) sample firms do not have a merger and 
acquisition during the sample period between 2007 and 2010. Among the three tests—audit fees, 
credit rating, and Tobin’s q, I am unable to conduct the credit rating test because there are not 
sufficient observations in the merger sample. 
Untabulated analyses of panel regressions for audit fees show the coefficient of sox404b 
is positive (0.24), and it is highly significant for the Merger&Acquisition sample. The coefficient 
of sox404b is 0.35 for the non-Merger&Acquisition sample.  Both of the coefficients are 
significant at 0.001 levels. The results are consistent with the result from the entire sample. 
Turning to the control variables, all the coefficients between the two subsamples are highly 
consistent. They are also consistent with the whole sample as well. This analysis provides 
evidence that the results are not driven by only one of the subsamples. 
Next, I conduct the same analyses for Tobin’s q for the two subsamples—merger firms 
and non-merger firms. The results are consistent between the two subsamples. The coefficient of 
sox404b is positive (0.38), and it is highly significant (p<0.01) for the merger sample. The 
coefficient of sox404b is positive (0.66), and it is highly significant (p<0.001) for the non-merger 
sample. The results are consistent with the result from the entire sample. For other control 
variables, the coefficients are very similar between the two subsamples. The coefficients are also 
consistent with the results from the entire sample. 
The above results demonstrate that merger and acquisition activity does not drive the 
results in the audit fees and Tobin’s q models. 
7.2.3 Industry-adjusted Tobin’s q   
Considering the variation among industries, I run the above models by using industry-
adjusted Tobin’s q. The industry-adjusted Tobin’s q for a company is the difference between its 
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own Tobin’s q and the mean Tobin’s q for its industry. Industry is defined at the two-digit SIC 
level. I also compute industry-adjusted Tobin’s q by taking the difference between its own 
Tobin’s q and the median Tobin’s q for its industry. The untabulated results show they provide 
consistent results for both measures of industry-adjusted Tobin’s q. 
Untabulated analyses of panel regressions for industry-adjusted Tobin’s q during the 
sample period of 2002-2010 show that the coefficient of sox404b is positive (0.21) and it is 
highly significant (p<0.001). The results are consistent with the results from the entire sample. 
Except for the coefficient of merger, all the rest of coefficients of the control variables present 
exactly the same results as using the raw Tobin’s q.14  
Table 16 reports panel regressions using industry-adjusted Tobin’s q as the dependent 
variable for the sample period of 2007-2010. Model 1 in table 16, within model, is the main 
regression model. The coefficient of sox404b in model 1 is positive (0.239), and highly 
significant (p<0.001). The economic magnitude of the coefficient on sox404b is also significant. 
It shows that if we measure at the sample mean (mean industry-adjusted Tobin’s q is 0.46 from 
untabulated results), the difference between SOX 404(b) compliance and SOX 404(b) non-
compliance’s industry-adjusted Tobin’s q is 51.96% (0.239 divided by 0.46). Model 2 in table 16 
is estimated by using the between regression approach. The coefficient on the variable sox404b in 
Model 2 is positive (0.847), and highly significant (p<0.001). Turning to the control variables in 
the within model, the coefficient on salegrowth is positive (0.07), and it is highly significant 
(p<0.001); the coefficient on size is negative (-0.67), and it is highly significant (p<0.001); the 
coefficient on lev is positive (0.37), and it is significant (p<0.05); the coefficient on ppe is 
negative (-0.11), and it is highly significant (p<0.001); the coefficient on ebit is negative (-0.03), 
and it is significant (p<0.05). Similar with the results from the raw Tobin’s q regression, the 
                                                            
14 The coefficient of merger in adjusted-Tobin’s q regression is negative (-0.0085), and it is not 
significant. However, it is negative (-0.02), and it is highly significant in raw Tobin’s q regression. 
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results suggest that a high Tobin’s q is associated with high sales growth, small firm size, high 
leverage, less tangible assets intensity.  
7.3 Inference summary for robustness checks 
 Figure 10 summarizes the robustness checks and associated inferences. I conducted three 
robust analysis, and I utilize within model for all the analyse. The first robust analysis is that I 
separate the sample into move-up group and move-down group. The inference is that audit fees 
increase for move-up group; audit fees decrease for move-down group. The inference for credit 
rating analysis is that credit rating improves for move-up group; credit rating deteriorates for 
move-down group. The inference for Tobin’s q analysis is that Tobin’s q increases for move-up 
group; Tobin’s q decreases for move-down group.  
 Secondly, I separate the sample into Merger&Acqusition group and non-
Merger&Acqusition group. The inference is that audit fees increase (decrease) for companies that 
switch from required noncompliance (compliance) to compliance (noncompliance) with SOX 
404(b) for the both of the groups. There are not enough observations to conduct credit rating 
analysis after I separate the sample. For Tobin’s q, the inference is that Tobin’s q increases 
(decreases) for companies that switch from required noncompliance (compliance) to compliance 
(noncompliance) with SOX 404(b) for the both of the Merger&Acqusition group and non-
Merger&Acqusition group. 
 Lastly, I replaced raw Tobin’s q with industry-adjusted Tobin’s q. The inference is that 
industry-adjusted Tobin’s q increases (decreases) for companies that switch from required 
noncompliance (compliance) to compliance (noncompliance) with SOX 404(b). 
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Table 16 
Panel regressions for adjusted-industry Tobin’s q analyses during the sample year of 2007 – 2010. 
 (1within) (2between) 
 adjusted_q adjusted_q 
Sox404b 0.239*** 0.847*** 
 (3.76) (11.74) 
   
Salegrowth 0.0734*** 0.262*** 
 (3.46) (7.66) 
   
Size -0.673*** -0.112*** 
 (-10.40) (-6.79) 
   
Lev 0.369* 0.446*** 
 (2.16) (4.22) 
   
Ppe -0.106*** -0.0955*** 
 (-4.03) (-8.44) 
   
Capital 0.0427 0.0613*** 
 (1.79) (6.33) 
   
Ebit -0.0315* -0.0347*** 
 (-2.37) (-5.11) 
   
Merger -0.0321 -0.310** 
 (-0.88) (-3.18) 
   
Ln_age -0.362 0.0755* 
 (-1.90) (2.46) 
   
Year effect Y Y 
   
Cons 4.129*** -1.537*** 
 (6.83) (-12.18) 
 
N 13089 13089 
This table presents coefficients from panel regressions of industry-adjusted Tobin’s q on Sox404b 
and other control variables as in Panel C of Table 1 during the sample year of 2007-2010. 
Sox404b is set equal to 1 if the firm is required to comply with Section 404(b), 0 otherwise. 
Industy-adjusted Tobin’s q is calculated as the difference between its own Tobin’s q and the 
mean Tobin’s q for its industry. Industry is defined at the two-digit SIC level. All regression use 
year dummies and unbalanced panels. *, **, and ***indicate significance at 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 
levels. t statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
  
Figure 10 
Analysis of Robustness Checks and Associated Inferences 
Procedure Model Sample Inference - Audit fees Inference - Credit rating Inference - Tobin's q 
Separate 
sample into 
move-up 
group and 
move-down 
group 
Within 
analysis 
move-up 
group 
Audit fees increase for companies 
that switch from required 
noncompliance to compliance 
with SOX 404(b) 
Credit rating improves for 
companies that switch from 
required noncompliance to 
compliance with SOX 404(b) 
Tobin's q increases for 
companies that switch from 
required noncompliance to 
compliance with SOX 404(b) 
move-
down 
group 
Audit fees decrease for 
companies that switch from 
required compliance to 
noncompliance with SOX 404(b) 
Credit rating deteriorates for 
companies that switch from 
required compliance to 
noncompliance with SOX 404(b) 
Tobin's q decreases for 
companies that switch from 
required compliance to 
noncompliance with SOX 404(b) 
Separate 
sample into 
Merger& 
Acquisition  
group and 
non-
Merger& 
Acquisition 
group 
Within 
analysis 
Merger& 
Acquisitio
n group 
Audit fees increase(decrease) for 
companies that switch from 
required noncompliance 
(compliance) to compliance 
(noncompliance) with SOX 
404(b) 
N/A. Not enough observations to 
conduct analysis 
Tobin's q increase(decrease) for 
companies that switch from 
required noncompliance 
(compliance) to compliance 
(noncompliance) with SOX 
404(b) 
non-
Merger& 
Acquisitio
n group 
Audit fees increase(decrease) for 
companies that switch from 
required noncompliance 
(compliance) to compliance 
(noncompliance) with SOX 
404(b) 
N/A. Not enough observations to 
conduct analysis 
Tobin's q increase(decrease) for 
companies that switch from 
required noncompliance 
(compliance) to compliance 
(noncompliance) with SOX 
404(b) 
Replace 
raw Tobin's 
q with 
industry-
adjusted 
Tobin's q 
Within 
analysis 
N/A N/A N/A 
Industry-adjusted Tobin's q 
increase(decrease) for companies 
that switch from required 
noncompliance (compliance) to 
compliance (noncompliance) 
with SOX 404(b) 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
In this study I document results consistent with SOX 404(b) imposing compliance costs, 
but also decreasing firms’ cost of debt, and overall, SOX 404(b) produces a net compliance 
benefit of around 8.63%. These Results are robust to using industry-adjusted Tobin’s q, 
separating the sample by firms which switch between noncompliance and compliance status, and 
splitting the sample into Merger&Acquisition and non-M&A groups. Overall, the evidence in this 
study provides consistent results that SOX 404(b) does bring a net compliance benefit to firms.  
As a caveat, I recognize that I cannot include all compliance costs and benefits. The 2009 
SEC survey (SEC 2009) particularly recognized four types of compliance costs. They are as 
follows: (1) audit fees paid to an external auditor, (2) consulting fees paid to an external vendor 
that are unrelated to audit fees, (3) internal employee labor expenses related to SOX 404(b), and 
(4) other non-labor expenses, such as software or travel expenses. Among the four types of costs, 
only audit fee data is publicly available, and it is hard to obtain or even measure the other three. 
The 2009 SEC survey (SEC 2009) categorized compliance benefits as direct or indirect. Direct 
benefits included improvements in internal control structure, audit committee’s confidence in 
company, financial reporting quality, the ability to prevent and detect fraud, efficiency of 
generating financial reporting, and timeliness of auditing financial report. On the other hand, the 
indirect benefits of an improved capability to raise capital, as well as increases in investors’ 
confidence, operation efficiency, the liquidity of company’s common stock, and overall company 
value. It is almost impossible to measure all the comprehensive benefits. 
Even with these limitations, this study makes several contributions to the literature. First, 
this study fills a gap in the current literature by being the first to address the question: “Does SOX 
404(b) bring a net compliance benefit to shareholders?” Utilizing a cost-benefit analysis 
methodology, this study answers that question in the affirmative. Other extant studies have 
looked only at the resultant audit fee reductions after the 2007 reforms (e.g., Doogar et. 2010; 
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Hoag et al. 2011; Kinney et al. 2011; Krishnan et al. 2011), and only two have documented how 
complying with SOX 404(b) benefits firms in discovering internal control weakness problems 
and in improving revenue quality (Bedard and Graham 2011 Krishnan and Yu 2012). To my 
knowledge, none of studies have presented evidence regarding how SOX 404(b) affects overall 
firm value premium. Using Tobin’s q to proxy for the net compliance benefit, this study 
documents on average, when a firm changes from noncompliance to compliance status, it 
experiences an 8.63% increase in firm value premium. Additionally, after removing the variations 
among different industries by replacing the raw Tobin’s q with an industry-adjusted Tobin’s q, 
the result is even stronger—it shows an increase in firm value premium of 51.96%. This result is 
robust under different procedures. Firstly, I separate the sample into two subsamples: a sample of 
moved up firm-years and a sample of moved-down firm-years.15 I conduct the same regression 
analysis under the two subsamples. The regression results show that the coefficient which 
measures the percentage change in firm value premium, sox404b, for both subsamples is 
significant at 0.001 level. The coefficients for moved-up firm-year and moved-down firm-year 
are 0.12 and 0.23 respectively. According to the results, moving into compliance status increases 
firm value premium by 12.75%, but falling to non-compliance status decrease value premium by 
25.86%.  
Secondly, I partition the sample into two subsamples based on whether firms have 
experienced Merger&Acquisition activity. The coefficient on sox404b for the regression for the 
sample of non-merger firms is 0.663, and it is statistically significant at 0.001 level. The 
coefficient of sox404b for the regression for the sample of merger firms is 0.379, and it is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. In summary, this study provides consistent evidence that 
SOX 404(b) does bring value premium to shareholders.  
                                                            
15 A sample of moved up firms refers to the firm-years that have changed from noncompliance 
status to compliance status. On the other side, a sample of moved down firms refers to the firm-
years that have changed from compliance status to noncompliance status. The reason to use firm-
year is because for some individual firms, they have experienced both changes in different years. 
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This study also contributes evidence to the current debate on the wisdom of exempting 
non-accelerated filers from SOX 404(b). Unlike prior studies (Iliev 2010; Bedard et al. 2011; 
Kinney et al. 2011), this study investigates SOX 404(b) over a longer time frame. A long-term 
cost-benefit analysis is critical toward deciding whether small firms should be exempt from SOX 
404(b). According to the SEC’s Chairman William H. Donaldson’s statement, the goal of SOX 
404(b) is to provide long-term benefits to investors (SEC 2005a). We could think of the whole 
procedure of auditor assessment of internal control as an investment for shareholders. It seems to 
be extremely costly at the beginning; however, the returns are generated over a long period of 
time.  
More broadly, this study also sheds lights on whether small firms should be exempted 
from many regulations which may only be useful when applied to larger firms. In theory, the 
audit exists to reduce the information asymmetry problem. Likewise, the purpose of many 
regulations is the same. However, compared with large firms, the information asymmetry is even 
more pronounced with smaller firms. It would be antithetical to exempt from regulation the firms 
which are most in need of reduction in information asymmetry. 
This study benefits policymakers. While prior research identifies specific costs and 
benefits of SOX 404(b), the net overall effects of the legislation have not been settled. This study 
finds that firm value premium increased for firms subject to SOX 404(b), suggesting that the 
entities which bore the greatest costs to comply with the legislation—firms and their 
shareholders—nonetheless benefitted from its passage.  This stands in contrast to post-legislation 
backlash by firms which voiced concerns that costs of complying with SOX 404(b) outweighed 
the benefits of doing so.   
The study also benefits firm shareholders and boards of directors.  In my study, firms 
subject to SOX 404(b) provisions experience benefits in reduced cost of debt and cost of equity 
capital that exceed the costs to comply with the provisions.  These findings compliment Cassell et 
al. (2011) who find that the net benefit in firm value extends also to small firms which voluntarily 
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adopt SOX 404(b) compliance. Taken together, these results suggest that increased internal 
control, particularly under the SOX 404(b) provisions, has benefitted shareholders; efforts 
directed at rolling back SOX provisions to reduce compliance costs may do more harm than good. 
  In addition, this study also should be of interest to auditors. Assessment of internal 
control is a new task for auditors. Unclear policy guidance and the learning curve make this task 
difficult for auditors. Auditors also face the pressure of reducing audit fees. For auditors who 
have done the assessment or will do it, it is inspiring to determine that their efforts are valuable. 
The results in this study will encourage auditors to continue to do their duty. 
Finally, this study should interest management as well. Particularly, this study provides 
an incentive for small firms’ management to consider complying with SOX 404(b). The results 
should convince management that regulation will not always bring too heavy a compliance 
burden to the firms, and firms can benefit from regulations such as SOX 404(b).  
To summarize, the results in this study clearly suggest that after the 2007 reform, as 
compliance costs have dropped dramatically, the benefit of SOX 404(b) outweighs the cost. This 
study indicates that it is may be unwise to exempt small firms from SOX 404(b). 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A.  
Credit rating conversion 
S&P Credit Rating 
Letter 
Rating Freq Percent 
AAA 1 53 0.66 
AA + 2 9 0.11 
AA 3 65 0.81 
AA- 4 88 1.1 
A+ 5 229 2.85 
A 6 510 6.35 
A- 7 444 5.53 
BBB+ 8 593 7.38 
BBB 9 969 12.06 
BBB- 10 793 9.87 
BB+ 11 556 6.92 
BB 12 799 9.95 
BB- 13 1,118 13.92 
B+ 14 884 11 
B 15 525 6.53 
B- 16 276 3.44 
CCC+1 17 123 1.53 
        1This category includes all the credit rating equal or below CCC+. 
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Appendix B. Sample selection 
Sample Selection – Audit Fees  
 
Audit Analytics data 2002-2010 58,097 
 
Remove SIC 6000 – 6999 observations (10,490) 
 
Merge with Compustat to obtain financial control variables       (9,111) 
 
Final sample                                                                                          38,496 
   Sample Selection – Credit Rating 
 
 
Audit Analytics data 2002-2010                                                         58,097 
 
Remove SIC 6000 – 6999 observations (10,490) 
 
Merge with Compustat to obtain financial variables  (39,573) 
 
Final sample 8,034 
   Sample Selection – Tobin’s q 
 
 
Audit Analytics data 2002-2010                                                         58,097 
 
Remove SIC 6000 – 6999 observations (10,490) 
 
Merge with Compustat to obtain financial variables (16,877) 
 
Final sample 30,730 
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